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A Baby-Step to Global Labor Reform:
Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Child
Frederick B. Jonassen*
INTRODUCTION
I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance
in London, that a young healthy child . . . is at a year old a most
delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted,
baked, or boiled, and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a
fricassee or a ragout.
Jonathan Swift, A Modest Proposal'
Observing the poverty of Irish children in the early
eighteenth century and reflecting upon the contemptuous and
callous attitude of the English elite toward them, Jonathan
Swift envisioned the parodic solution of serving these children
as a culinary delicacy with which to garnish English dinner
tables. This would both supplement the English diet and reduce
the number of unwanted children. As to critics of his plan, Swift
suggested they
first ask the parents of these mortals whether they would not at this
day think it a great happiness to have been sold for food at a year old
in the manner I prescribe, and thereby have avoided such a perpetual
Assistant Professor, Barry University School of Law. J.D., Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington, 1997. Ph.D., Cornell University, 1983. The author
thanks Professors Alfred C. Aman, Jr., of the Indiana University School of Law,
Calvin Sharpe of the Case University School of Law, and Barry Dubner and Leonard
Birdsong of the Barry University School of Law for their comments and
encouragement regarding this paper, and also Leonard Addison, my research
assistant for his tireless work checking and correcting sources.
1. In 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 2181, 2182 (M.H.
Abrams, ed., 1993).
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scene of misfortunes as they have since gone through ....
More than two centuries later, the globalization of economic
activity makes far more efficient use of children, putting them to
work to manufacture products or cultivate crops as cheaply as
possible. Just as surely as anything Swift imagined, this
arrangement consumes poor children for the economic, if not the
dietary, benefit of the world's wealthy, to whom, as it happens,
a reasonably-priced shirt or a pair of shoes is preferable to a
roasted child.
It is an irony that might well have intrigued Swift that one
of the major causes of exploitative child labor, the multi-
national corporation (MNC), may well provide a partial solution
to the problem. Under circumstances in which conventional
processes and institutions of international law have failed and
seem likely to continue failing to control child labor, corporate
codes of conduct-that is, statements of rules regulating labor
that MNCs voluntarily and unilaterally adopt, announce,
publicize, and, with varying degrees of effectiveness, implement
in order to avoid bad publicity for their products-not only hold
promise for reducing exploitative child labor, but have already
proven useful in achieving that goal.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I details the problem
of exploitative child labor. Part II reviews the international and
national efforts to regulate child labor and will show how these
efforts have largely failed. Part III examines the political and
cultural difficulties that have impeded attempts to control child
labor. Part [V reviews extra-legal codes of conduct from the
past. Finally, Part V assesses the apparent and potential
success of the strategy.
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF EXPLOITATIVE CHILD LABOR
There is, of course, work that children perform that is not
abusive or harmful to them and that provides skills and work
habits that are useful later in life.' This type of work may be
properly characterized as educational and beneficial. The
concern in this paper, however, is with exploitative child labor
in which school-age children work for excessively long hours
under conditions that are dangerous or harmful to their physical
2. Id. at 2186.
3. See ALEC FYFE, CHILD LABOUR 3 (1989); Robert Weissman, Stolen Youth:
Brutalized Children, Globalization and the Campaign to End Child Labor, 18




or mental health.' There are no authoritative estimates of how
many children labor in exploitative situations.' Examples of
exploitation on a gigantic scale, however, are readily visible and
well-publicized. There are boys who work in Colombian coal
mines where, like the chimney sweeps of old, they crawl through
narrow tunnels to chip at exposed coal amidst high levels of
dust.6 In Cambodia, children work in brick-making factories,
suffering cuts and injuries to their bare hands and bare feet.7
Children cut Brazilian sugar cane with razor-sharp machetes,
and are exposed to pesticides.8 In Latin America and parts of
Africa, children who serve as domestics are forced to work long
hours while being subject to physical and sexual abuse.9 In
many countries homeless children earn a living as street
vendors or rag pickers who search garbage heaps for things to
sell. All the dangers and corruptions of the streets threaten
these children.' °
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is a Geneva-
based United Nations agency that issues "conventions" setting
international labor standards that governments, companies, and
labor delegates approve at annual conferences." The
organization estimated that from 1979 to 1996 the number of
children working in the world's labor force increased from fifty-
six million to nearly a quarter of a billion." According to the
4. FYFE, supra note 3, at 18-19 (providing eight criteria proposed by UNICEF
to determine the extent to which a particular form of child labor is exploitative).
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, THE APPAREL
INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD
LABOR PROBLEM? 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter APPAREL INDUSTRY], available at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/apparel/apparel.pdf; UNICEF, REPORT
1997: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN, How Many Children Work? 1, 2 (1997),
available at http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/report/many.htm.
6. Weissman, supra note 3, at 2.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
9. See FYFE, supra note 3, at 114-16; ROGER SAWYER, CHILDREN ENSLAVED
140-42 (1988).
10. See FYFE, supra note 3, at 97-114; A BEQUELE & W. MYERS, FIRST THINGS
FIRST IN CHILD LABOUR 146-47, 152-53 (1995).
11. See http://www.ilo.org/globalllang--enlindex.htm (English-language website
of the ILO).
12. See Timothy A. Glut, Note, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor:
An International Solution to an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1203, 1206-07 (1995); David Holley, WTO's Small Step Forward on Workers' Rights,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1996, at D1; CHILD LABOUR TODAY: FACTS AND FIGURES (1996)
(pointing out that in 1996, the ILO estimated that the number of economically active
children between 10 and 14 years of age was seventy-three million, or 13.2% of all
children in that age group). Assefa Bequele of the ILO stated that
[n]o reliable figures on workers under 10 are available though their
2008]
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ILO, more than ninety-five percent of child laborers live in the
developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 3 From
1983 to 1992, the annual number of births in these countries
rose by only 15 %."4 This increase in child laborers, therefore,
cannot be attributed to the greater number of children in the
world. 1
Instead, the rise of the MNC most likely accounts for the
increase in child labor in the third world. Typically, an MNC is
based in an industrialized country that has long enforced laws
against child labor. 6 For such companies, poor, underdeveloped,
third-world countries provide a competitive advantage in the
form of cheap labor. 7 Child labor is among the cheapest. The
MNC, through its contractors, will pay children far less than it
would have to pay workers in its home country, and pockets the
differential. The arrangement is also beneficial to the
underdeveloped country, for MNCs bring investment, jobs,
markets, and other services that develop economic
infrastructure. Hence, the economic circumstances of child
labor result in a globalized "race to the bottom" in which wages
are reduced as much as possible.'8
Asia has the highest absolute number of child laborers. 9 In
terms of population, however, Africa has the greatest percentage
of children who work." Many countries can illustrate the extent
that children suffer from work exploitation. India, however,
exemplifies the problem on a particularly large scale.
Article 24 of the Indian Constitution states, "No child below
numbers .. .are significant. The same is true for children between 14 and
15 .... If all of these could be counted and if proper account were taken of
the domestic work performed full-time by girls, the total number of child
workers around the world today might well be in the hundreds of millions.
CHILD LABOUR TODAY: FACTS AND FIGURES (1996).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, 1 BY THE SWEAT
AND TOIL OF CHILDREN [VOLUME 1: THE USE OF CHILD LABOR IN U.S.
MANUFACTURED AND MINED IMPORTS] 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter SWEAT AND TOIL].
14. Glut, supra note 12, at 1207 n.19.
15. See id. at 1208.
16. See Natasha Rossell Jaffe & Jordan D. Weiss, Note, The Self-Regulating
Corporation: How Corporate Codes Can Save Our Children, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 893, 899 (2006).
17. See id. at 900.
18. See id.; see also Stephen Chapman, How Americans Can Stop Child Labor
Abroad, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1994, at C3.
19. ILO, BITTER HARVEST (1997), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/
actrav/genact/child/part2_alagric.htm.
20. See id.; Jens Andvig, Sudharshan Canagarajah & Anne Kielland, Child
Labor in Africa: Issues and Challenges, FINDINGS 194 (November 2001) (describing




the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any
factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous
employment. ' 2' The Indian Parliament abolished bonded labor
in 1976, and in 1986 enacted a statute prohibiting children
under fourteen from working in a number of occupations,
including carpet weaving.2 2 The Indian Supreme Court has
ruled that bonded labor is a violation of fundamental
constitutional rights and an affront to human dignity.23 In spite
of this, bonded labor continues to exist in India in two main
forms. Under inherited bondage, children work off debt
incurred by preceding generations.24 Under bondage by debt,
family members who have accumulated debts sell their children
into bondage in exchange for loans.25 Typically, these parents
sell their children into bondage to agents or traffickers who
scour India's poorest areas, such as Bihar or Uttar Pradesh, for
such cheap labor and bring children to the carpet-weaving
regions of Mirzapur or the Vale of Kashmir.26 Some children are
kidnapped, some are allegedly adopted and then sent to work,
and some are tricked into running away.27  These include
children less than ten years of age.28
In 2003, Human Rights Watch issued a report on bonded
child labor and India's silk industry. The summary of the report
stated:
[mjillions of children in India toil as virtual slaves, unable to escape
the work that will leave them impoverished, illiterate, and often
crippled by the time they reach adulthood. These are India's bonded
child laborers. A majority of them are Dalits, so-called untouchables.
Bound to their employers in exchange for a loan, they are unable to
leave while in debt and earn so little that they may never be free of it.
The Indian government knows about these children and has the
21. INDIA CONST. art 24. See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying
the International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor,
20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 371 n.70 (1995).
22. See Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 371 n.70.
23. See id. at 371 n.71.
24. See ANTI-SLAVERY INTERNATIONAL, CHILDREN IN BONDAGE - SLAVES OF THE
SUBCONTINENT 24 (1991) [hereinafter CHILDREN IN BONDAGE]; Ehrenberg, supra
note 21, at 372; ROGER SAWYER, SLAVERY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 128 (1986).
25. CHILDREN IN BONDAGE, supra note 24, at 25.
26. See id. at 9-10, 25-26; PETER LEE-WRIGHT, CHILD SLAVES 52 (1990);
Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 372 n.82 (citing Ben Tierney & Dave Todd, Swept
Under the Carpet: About 10 Million Children in India Work in Slavery-Many of
Them, as Carpet Boys in the Rug Trade, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Sept. 29, 1991, at A4).
27. See CHILDREN IN BONDAGE, supra note 24, at 25; ANTI-SLAVERY
INTERNATIONAL, A PATTERN OF SLAVERY - INDIA'S CARPET BOYS 5 (1988) [hereinafter
INDIA'S CARPET BOYS].
28. See Tierney & Todd, supra note 26, at A4.
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mandate to free them. Instead, for reasons of apathy, caste bias, and
corruption, many government officials deny that they exist at all.2 9
Many of India's bonded child laborers work in the carpet
weaving industry. Typically they work twelve hours a day and
subsist on a diet of "rotis and watery lentils."3 Because they are
far from home, they sleep on the dirt floors of the huts where
they work.3 Many are beaten, tortured, and sexually abused.
They receive no medical attention.
3 2
Besides the carpet industry, thousands of children work in
the Indian glass industry. These children work with or near
molten glass and crude open furnaces in factories littered with
broken glass and filled with air polluted by chemicals, soot, and
coal dust.33 They are susceptible to asthma, bronchitis, eye
problems, burns, and chronic anemia.34 Seventy-six percent of
them have tuberculosis."
Numbers and scale, of course, have a certain significance
and impact, but the description of this tragedy is incomplete
without a consideration of the sufferings individual children
endure. Thirteen-year-old Praiwan in Bangkok makes leather
handbags from eight o'clock in the morning until eleven o'clock
at night, and after waiting in line for a shower, goes to bed at
one o'clock in the morning. He gets only two days off each
month and earns a total of twenty-four dollars per month for his
labor.36 Twelve-year-old Luis works from dawn to 10:00 p.m. in
carnation fields near Bogota. He mixes pesticides, some of
which have been banned in the United States and Europe,
without gloves, mask, or any protection. "When they spray the
pesticides, I get sick, but my family needs the money."37 Eleven-
29. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SMALL CHANGE: BONDED CHILD LABOR IN
INDIA'S SILK INDUSTRY, in I. Summary (2004), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
india/index.htm. [hereinafter SMALL CHANGE].
30. INDIA'S CARPET Boys, supra note 27, at 5; see also Tierney & Todd, supra
note 26, at A4; LEE-WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 52.
31. See INDIA'S CARPET BOYS, supra note 27, at 22; Tierney & Todd, supra note
26, at A4.
32. See CHILDREN IN BONDAGE, supra note 24, at 40; INDIA'S CARPET BOYS,
supra note 27, at 5, 14, 19, 26, 29-30; Christopher Thomas, Singh Links Drive to
Assist Lowly Castes with Plight of Child Slaves, THE TIMES [London], Sept. 20, 1990;
Tierney & Todd, supra note 26, at A4.
33. See LEE-WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 47; Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 374
n.98 (citing Joseph Albright & Marcia Kunstel, Stolen Childhood, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5,
1987, at Cl).
34. See LEE-WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 44-45.
35. CHILDREN IN BONDAGE, supra note 24, at 12.
36. See Lynn Kamm, How Our Greed Keeps Kids Trapped in Foreign
Sweatshops, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1993, at C5.
37. See Jocasta Shakespeare, Gardens of Shame, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Oct. 1,
[Vol. 17:1
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year-old Yeramma, bonded in the Indian silk industry since she
was seven, gets up at 4:00 a.m. to wind silk, works twelve hours
a day, sleeps in the factory in spaces between the machines, and
is beaten if she makes any mistakes. 8 Thirteen-year-old Lesly
in Honduras works up to eighty hours per week making
sweaters for thirty-eight cents per hour. She endures beatings,
locked bathrooms, unreachable quotas, and managers who "like
to touch the girls."39 There are millions of these stories.
In the midst of these tragedies, however, there is some good
news. In its 2006 Report of the General Director, "The End of
Child Labour: Within Reach," 40 the ILO found that from 2000 to
2004, there has been a modest decrease in children involved in
child labor, from 246 million to 218 million worldwide.' Noting
that there is a great deal yet to be done, the report reviewed
many causes for this improvement, among them, the
"cooperation of employers," which "is crucial in the fight against
child labour because they can help to ensure that their
enterprises are free of child labour ... [and] play a powerful role
in influencing those who hire children ....
II. PAST EFFORTS TO REGULATE EXPLOITATIVE CHILD
LABOR
Past efforts at regulating child labor in the global
marketplace through international law and domestic law have
largely failed. Timothy Glut reviews a variety of these attempts
to limit child labor internationally. 3
A. ILO CONVENTIONS AND TRIPARTITE DECLARATION
Over many years, the ILO has issued conventions
discussing the subject of child labor.4  In 1921, the ILO
produced Convention No. 5, "Fixing the Minimum Age for
Admission of Children to Industrial Employment," and in 1941,
1995, at 42.
38. See SMALL CHANGE, supra note 29.
39. Glut, supra note 12, at 1205 (referencing Michael Zuckoff, Free-Trade,
Human Rights Clash Over GATT, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1994, at 77).
40. International Labour Office, Report of the Director-General: The End of
Child Labour: Within Reach, 95 ILO INT'L LABOUR CONF. REP. I(B) (2006)
[hereinafter The End of Child Labour], available at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/standardsrelm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf.
41. See id. at 6 tbll.1.
42. Id. at 18.
43. See Glut, supra note 12.
44. See id. at 1226 (listing various ILO Conventions).
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ILO Convention No. 59, which had the same title.45  ILO
Convention No. 138, "Concerning the Minimum Age for
Admission to Employment," introduced in 1973, incorporated
provisions from its predecessors.46 It requires that each party
set a minimum age for employment not less than the age of
completion of compulsory education, with an absolute minimum
of fifteen years old.47  The Convention, however, permits
developing countries to limit the initial scope of the Convention
and to lower the minimum working age to fourteen years if a
need is shown.48 It also permits children as young as thirteen
years old to perform light work. In developing countries that
may limit the scope of the Convention, children twelve to
fourteen years old may perform such work.49
In 1999, the ILO issued Convention 182, "Concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labour."5  This Convention prohibits
child labor for which there is no economic justification due to the
illegal and harmful nature of the labor. The Convention defines
a child as a person under eighteen years of age.5" "[T]he worst
forms of child labour" that Convention 182 bans include slavery,
bondage, compulsory recruitment of children in armed conflict,
prostitution, pornography, the use of children in drug
trafficking, and "work which, by its nature or the circumstances
in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or
morals of children."52  Article 5 requires state signatories to
"establish or designate appropriate mechanisms to monitor" its
implementation. 3 Article 6 requires signatories to "design and
implement programmes of action to eliminate as a priority the
worst forms of child labour."54 In its attempt to eliminate child
labor that injures the child, Convention 182 focuses on an area
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See ILO CONVENTION 138, art. 1.3, reprinted in APPAREL INDUSTRY, supra
note 5, at 235-42.
48. See ILO CONVENTION 138, supra note 47 at art. 1.4, & art. 5.
49. See id. at art. 6.1-6.4.
50. See ILO CONVENTION 182, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/englishI
standards/relmiilcilc87/com-chic.htm.
51. See id. at art. 2.
52. Id. at art. 3.
53. Id. at art. 5.
54. Id. at art. 6. See generally ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, 86 INT'L LABOUR CONF. (identifying four core labor rights,





of near universal consensus.
The effect of ILO conventions is limited in several respects.
Some countries where child labor is widespread have not signed
Convention 138."5 Further, ILO conventions do not have much
in the way of "teeth."56 Only once, in 2000, did the ILO invoke
its enforcement mechanism, in that case against Burma for its
continuous use of forced labor. 7  The ILO requested all
multilateral agencies of the U.N. to refrain from providing
further assistance to Burma, in effect promoting a world-wide
boycott of the country. 8 The ultimate sanction that the ILO
could take, that of expelling a country, is of little use because it
would "negate any influence the ILO had over that country in
the future."59
The ILO has a Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.6" This
code goes into great detail about workers' rights, extending to
issues such as job creation and investment in the local
economy.' It also provides a more specific complaint procedure
before a Standing Committee on Multinational Enterprises that
can investigate and make specific findings.6 2 It too, however,
has no enforcement mechanism.63 The bottom line is that the
ILO has procedures to investigate situations of child labor,
provide hearings, and make reports and recommendations, but
it can do little more than discreetly advise or publicly embarrass
a signatory. As Daniel Ehrenberg puts it, "[tihe ILO relies on
moral persuasion, publicity, shame, diplomacy, and dialogue to
ensure compliance by member states."64
55. See ILOLEX: DATABASE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS, available
at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm; Glut, supra note 12, at 1226
n.170.
56. Sarosh C. Kuruvilla & Anil Verma, International Labor Standards, Soft
Regulation, and National Government Roles, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ILR
COLLECTION, ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS, 8 (2006), available at http://digitalcommons
.ilr.cornell.edularticles/37.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 8.
60. ILO, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977), in DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL
& RICHARD L. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS GUIDELINES 254 (1983), cited by Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-
Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 671 (1995).
61. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 671.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 388-89.
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B. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.65 Sections 32(2)(a),
(b), and (c) of that document requires states to establish a
minimum age for admission to employment, regulate the hours
and conditions of employment, and provide penalties to enforce
these provisions.66  But like the ILO Conventions, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, while it provides for the
monitoring and collection of information regarding the rights of
children, lacks an enforcement mechanism. Of the 174 nations
that have ratified the Convention, one-third have lodged
reservations allowing them exemptions.6 7  Some of these
reservations, such as those of various Islamic countries
indicating that the Convention will be interpreted in accordance
with Islamic law and values, may be so basic as to undermine
the object and purposes of the Convention.68 Further, the
Convention's use of the term "appropriate" to describe the
regulations of hours and conditions of employment, its penalties
for violations, and its failure to set standards for minimum age
of employment are defects that render the document vague and
unenforceable.69 The United States did not sign the Convention
65. Glut, supra note 12, at 1224; Susan O'Rourke von Struensee, Violence,
Exploitation and Children: Highlights of the United Nations Children's Convention
and International Response to Children's Human Rights, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 589, 589 (1995). G.A. RES. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.S.
Doc. A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter Convention].
66. Convention, art. 32, supra note 65, states:
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be
hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the
child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and
educational measures to ensure the implementation of the present article.
To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of other
international instruments, States Parties shall in particular:
Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to employment;
Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of
employment;
Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective
enforcement of the present article.
67. O'Rourke von Struensee, supra note 65, at 590 n.3.
68. See Cynthia Price Cohen, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights of the
Child, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 93-94 (1993) (citing Reservations, Declarations and
Objections Relating to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Committee on the
Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/2[Rev.1 (1992), at 17).
69. See Maureen Moran, Ending Exploitative Child Labor Practices, 5 PACE
[Vol. 17:1
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until 1993 and has never ratified it. For these reasons, the
Convention does not appear to be a vital force for the
diminishment of child labor.
C. THE U.N. AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
In the early 1970s, the U.N. developed and promoted, but
never adopted, a Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations." It was promoted by developing countries
opposed to corporate interference in their national political
affairs, such as ITT's involvement in the overthrow of Chilean
President Salvador Allende.7' The Code refers to human rights
and workers' rights in a very general way.72 Its influence waned
as the liberalized global economy strengthened with the result
that developing countries came to prize multinationals instead
of regarding them with suspicion.73
In 1976, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development established Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.74  This Code recognizes the right of labor to
organize and bargain collectively, and bans discrimination in
employment.75 It also provides a complaint procedure against
companies.76 Though there is no enforcement mechanism, labor
and management have occasionally resolved their differences
through the OECD.77
Lacking the ability to impose sanctions, the U.N. and OECD
Codes do not add much to the ILO Conventions and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.7" They do, however,
present a conceptual difference from the ILO and U.N.
Conventions that is notable in the light of globalization: these
INT'L L. REV. 287, 291 (1993).
70. Development and International Economic Co-operation: Transnational
Corporations, U.S. Economic and Social Commission, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 7(d), at
U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990), cited in Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note
60, at 669.
71. Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 60, at 669-70.
72. Id. at 670.
73. Id.
74. OECD, DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (originally written in 1976, revised in 1979), in CAMPBELL & ROWAN,
supra note 60, at 254, cited in Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 60, at
670.
75. CAMPBELL & ROwAN, supra note 60, at 258-65.
76. Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 60, at 671.
77. Id. See generally JOHN ROBINSON, MULTINATIONALS AND POLITICAL
CONTROL (St. Martin's Press 1983).
78. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 60, at 669-71.
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codes do not presume to create law for the states, but rather
only attempt to provide guidance and regulation for MNCs.
D. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
became effective on January 1, 1948." On January 1, 1995, as a
result of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, GATT was succeeded by the World Trade
Organization (WTO).8°  The purpose of GATT/WTO is to
"liberalize international trade and place it on a secure basis,
thereby contributing to the economic growth, development, and
welfare of the world's people."8  As of January 2007, one
hundred and fifty governments were members of GATT/WTO.82
Accounting for the overwhelming majority of world trade,
members are obliged to negotiate the reduction of tariffs,
eliminate non-tariff barriers, and refrain from discriminatory
treatment.83 Unfortunately, human rights groups have not been
able to make recognition of workers' rights, such as prohibiting
child labor, a condition for trade under the GATT/WTO
agreement.84  Developing countries have opposed such
restrictions, arguing that the measures are protectionist and
would hinder developing countries from competing with
developed countries in the global market.85 These countries also
maintain that such measures would only punish children who
are an important source of income for their families.86 The
treaty would, however, allow a country that did not wish to
accept imports produced by child labor to make side treaties
79. Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 390 (citing generally THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Pt.
5, at A3 U.N.T.S. 194).
80. Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 390 (citing generally FINAL ACT EMBODYING
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE MULTILATERAL [WORLD] TRADE ORGANIZATION,
GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter FINAL
ACT]).
81. Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 391 (citing FINAL ACT).
82. World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis_e/
tife/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
83. Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 391.
84. Glut, supra note 12, at 1230.
85. Zuckoff, supra note 39, at 78.
86. From the perspective of many developing countries, the ILO, rather than
the WTO, is the appropriate agency to pursue the implementation of labor
standards. See Farkhanda Mansoor, The WTO versus the ILO and the Case of Child
Labor, WEB JOURNAL OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2004), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/
2004/dload2.html.; see also Anna Quindlen, Public & Private; Out of the Hands of
Babes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1994, at A23.
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concerning such imports. 7
E. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The situation is similar to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).8  The purpose of this treaty is to
eliminate trade barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States. Those who wanted to protect workers were
unable to include recognition of workers' rights in the NAFTA
agreement itself.8 9 After the passage of NAFTA, however, the
Clinton Administration negotiated side agreements
guaranteeing that Mexico would adhere to these rights,
including a limitation on child labor.90 The side agreement with
Mexico and Canada under NAFTA, the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), provided a helpful
precedent for the United States in seeking similar
arrangements with foreign countries under GATT/WTO. But
rather than impose uniform labor conditions among the
members of NAFTA, NAALC only encourages members to
enforce their own labor laws.9' Opponents have criticized
NAALC for its unwieldy complaint procedures and for its
ineffective measures meant to improve the lot of Mexican
workers.9 2
The United States has completed a number of other free
trade agreements that include labor rights components, such as
agreements with Chile, Singapore, Jordan, and Cambodia, but
these have been criticized for weak enforcement provisions.9 3 In
any event, it remains difficult to persuade developing countries
to enter into side agreements that establish the very same labor
standards that they opposed in negotiating GATT/WTO.
87. Glut, supra note 12, at 1230-31.
88. Id. at 1230 (citing the NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION ACT, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.)).
89. John Dillon, Campaign Over NAFTA Comes Down to the Wire, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 16, 1993, at 1-2.
90. RONALD G. EHRENBERG, LABOR MARKETS AND INTEGRATING NATIONAL
ECONOMICS 94 (1994).
91. Kuruvilla & Verma, supra note 56, at 12.
92. See Joshua Briones, Paying the Price for NAFTA: NAFTA's Effect on
Women and Children Laborers in Mexico, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 321-22 (1999);
see also Joan M. Smith, North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of Working
Children, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 57, 85-87 (1994).
93. See Don Wells, "Best Practice" in the Regulation of International Labor
Standards: Lessons of the U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement, 27 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 357, 358-59 (2006).
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F. THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES AND CHILD
LABOR DETERRENCE ACT
The United States has a variety of generalized trade laws
that condition trade with foreign countries upon some degree of
regulation in child labor. These include the Generalized System
of Preferences,94 the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,95
the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act,96 and the Andean Trade
Preferences Act.97 The Overseas Private Investment Guarantee
Agency98 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 99
promote investment and economic aid in countries, if they adopt
policies that include the recognition of workers' rights, such as a
minimum-age requirement for employment. The Trade Act of
1974 provides for retaliation against violations.' 9 The U.S.
Congress adopted ILO Convention 182 regarding the worst
forms of child labor,'0 ' so a state that "has not implemented its
commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor" is not
eligible for trade benefits under the Generalized System of
Preferences.'0 2
From 1989 to 1995, U.S. Senator Tom Harkin introduced
versions of a bill known as the Child Labor Deterrence Act.
10 3
The 1993 version would have required the Secretary of Labor to
consult with organizations such as the ILO to determine which
foreign countries make use of the labor of children under fifteen
in their industries.' °4 The Secretary was then to place the
names of the violating countries and industries in the Federal
Register 5 and impose a prohibition on the importation of any
product from that foreign industry.°6 The difficulty with this bill
and other unilateral measures that would prohibit imports
produced by child labor is that they are likely to violate the
94. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2467 (2000).
95. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (2000).
96. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3706 (2000).
97. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (2000).
98. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2192-2200 (2000).
99. 22 U.S.C. § 290k (2000).
100. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2467 (2000).
101. 19 U.S.C. § 2467(6) (2000).
102. Junlin Ho, The International Labour Organization's Role in Nationalizing
the International Movement to Abolish Child Labor 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 337, 345-46
(2006) (construing 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(H) (2000)).
103. Glut, supra note 12, at 1219. The 1993 version is found in 139 CONG. REC.
S3179 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1993). The 1995 version is in 141 CONG. REC. S5404 (daily
ed. Apr. 6, 1995).
104. Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1993, S. 613, 103d Cong. § 4(a) (1993).
105. Id. § 4(e)(1).
106. Id. § 5(a)(1).
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GATT Treaty, which provides that "no prohibitions or
restrictions ... whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses, or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party ... .
Though the United States may adopt and enforce this
legislation anyway, such unilateral measures would also invite
trade retaliation from foreign countries.'
In regard to trade sanctions against foreign countries in
which child labor is abused, the new GATT may present more
difficulties than its predecessor. If a country violated the old
GATT by such sanctions as a ban on imports produced by
children, imposing a penalty on the violator required the
unanimous consent of all parties. 19 The latest GATT, however,
requires the unanimous consent of all parties not to impose such
a penalty."' Under the old framework, the United States could
avoid a penalty by objecting to it."' Under the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
of the new GATT, a dispute that resists negotiation would be
submitted to a panel whose decision, if not appealed, is adopted
unless the members decide by consensus not to adopt it." 2 This
system virtually guarantees the adoption of panel decisions and
renders the United States unable to block the adoption of a
decision that would impose a penalty."3
In prohibiting the import of products manufactured in
countries that tolerate exploitative child labor, the United
States might well avail itself of several defenses. It could claim
that the prohibition on child labor is erga omnes so that the
prohibition takes precedence over GATT rules."4 The United
107. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. XI, quoted by Glut, supra note 12, at 1219-
20. See id. at 1231-33 for a more detailed discussion on how measures such as the
Child Labor Deterrence Act are inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade.
108. Glut, supra note 12, at 1218, 1220.
109. Id. at 1231.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1232.
112. Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994), Part II, Annex 2, 16.4 [hereinafter
USD]; Glut, supra note 12, at 1232.
113. Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 199 (1994) (statement of John H. Jackson,
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School), cited in Glut, supra note 12,
at 1232.
114. Glut, supra note 12, at 1233. Erga omnes rights are those which apply to
all states. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J.
3, 32 (Feb. 5).
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States may argue that the sanction against nations that permit
child labor is a threat to human health and therefore qualifies
as an exception under GATT, Art. 20. '15 But a country
attempting to claim such an exception must deal with GATT
panels that interpret this article as permitting only the least
GATT-inconsistent measures possible."6  Further, the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade counsels a country
such as the United States to "take into account the special
development, financial and trade needs of developing country
Members" and ensure that its regulations "do not create
unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing countries.""' 7
Finally, the United States, which has not ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, will appear hypocritical
in maintaining that its only interest in imposing trade sanctions
is to protect children."8  This situation exposes the United
States to the accusation that its real motives are protectionist.
G. THE EHRENBERG PROPOSAL
Daniel Ehrenberg suggests that the offices of the ILO and
GATT/WTO be melded into an enforcement regime that would
address the problem of child labor."9 He argues that the use of
child labor in violation of ILO standards "should be viewed as a
state subsidy or 'social dumping' that give[s] states an unfair
competitive advantage."'2 ° The exploitation of child labor, then,
would be an unfair trade practice. To address complaints of
labor violations such as exploitative child labor, Ehrenberg
proposes a bifurcated process consisting of a determinative
phase and a remedial phase. The determinative phase would
begin with a detailed complaint filed by a member state of the
ILO or GATT/WTO or a bona fide employer or worker
organization from such a state. The complaint would then go to
115. Glut, supra note 12, at 1233; see also Madeleine Grey Bullard, Child Labor
Prohibitions Are Universal, Binding, and Obligatory Law: The Evolving State of
Customary International Law Concerning the Unempowered Child Laborer, 24
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 139, 147-158 (2001) (examining the extent, causes, and effects of
child labor).
116. Report of the Panel, Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and
International Taxes on Cigarettes, 74, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th
Supp.) at 223 (1991). See also Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 13,
1993, art. 2, para. 2.2, cited in Glut, supra note 12, at 1234.
117. Glut, supra note 12, at 1234; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
art. 12, 12.2-.3.
118. Glut, supra note 12, at 1236.
119. Ehrenberg, supra note 21, at 404-08.
120. Id. at 379.
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an Admissibility Panel, and then a Dispute Panel, which would
issue a panel report that is then circulated to the parties. If
adopted by an ILO-GATT/WTO panel charged with
enforcement, the losing party could appeal to the International
Court of Justice. The remedial phase is equally complex.1 2 The
procedure is limited to ILO or WTO member states whose
workers would somehow have access to the means of making
such complaints. 
21
The WTO conference, which was held during December
1996, in Singapore, rendered the implementation of such a
scheme unlikely. Though the conference participants issued a
final declaration that referred to the "observance of
internationally recognized core labor standards," the declaration
pointedly identified the ILO as the "competent body to set and
deal with these standards.' 23  The Doha Conference of 2001,
responding to the objection of developing countries, similarly
reaffirmed the declaration made at Singapore. 24  The
enforcement mechanisms of the WTO, then, would not be placed
in the service of forging a link between free trade and labor
standards. Instead, the Declaration explicitly endorsed the
rationale under which developing countries oppose this linkage.
"We reject the use of labor standards for protectionist purposes,
and agree that the comparative advantage of countries,
particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be
put into question."'
125
H. CHILD LABOR AS JUS COGENS
In the presence of international conventions and
widespread domestic laws that prohibit child labor, the
distinctly supine posture of the world community in regard to
this issue is somewhat surprising. Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice recognizes three primary
sources of international law: international conventions,
international custom, and the principles of civilized nations.2 6
121. Id. at 408-14.
122. Ryan P. Toftoy, Note, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the
Global Theater. Is Nike Just Doing It? 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 905, 927 (1998).
123. Holley, supra note 12, at D1. The quotation is taken from the Singapore
Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996, World Trade Organization,
WTMIN(96)/DEC, 36 I.L.M. 218, 4 (1997) [hereinafter Singapore Declaration],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thetwoe/ministe/min96_e/wtodec-e.htm.
124. Mansoor, supra note 86, at 3.
125. Singapore Declaration, supra note 123, 4.
126. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a)-(c), reprinted in
ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW COURSEBOOK 307 (Anderson Publishing
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In regard to principles of civilized nations, virtually all countries
in the world have domestic laws that place limits on child
labor.'27  Though these domestic prohibitions are often
unenforced, 2  they nonetheless provide evidence for the
existence of a general principle of law among nations. In regard
to conventions, more than one hundred and ninety-three states
have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which,
among other things, requires that signatories adopt and enforce
regulations limiting child labor.'29 Finally, to establish the
existence of a rule of customary international law, it is
necessary to show general and consistent state practice and
state belief, or opinio juris, that compliance with the rule is a
legal obligation.'30  General practice is evident from the
limitations on child labor that virtually all nations have in their
domestic law. And opinio juris might be argued from the
agreement of parties to the Child's Rights Convention to comply
with its informational and monitoring requirements, an
indication that these states consider the limitations of the treaty
a matter of international as well as domestic law. '' All of this
evidence, once assembled, should be sufficient to support an
argument that the rule against exploitative child labor is jus
cogens, or is approaching such status.32 At this time, however,
no international court has held that child labor is a matter of
international law. '33
Co. 1994).
127. See Convention, supra note 65, for a list of countries that have ratified the
Convention.
128. Glut, supra note 12, at 1215, 1222-23.
129. See Convention, supra note 65; for a list of countries that have ratified the
Convention, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Status of Ratification [hereinafter Status of
Ratification], http://ohchr.org/englishlbodies/ratification/Il.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2007).
130. LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-11 (Oxford
Univ. Press 4th ed. 1990). See Glut, supra note 12, at 1214-17, for a discussion on
opinio juris.
131. Article 43 of the Convention establishes a Committee on the Rights of the
Child. Under Article 44, parties must periodically report to the Committee: "States
Parties undertake to submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the
rights recognized herein and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights."
See Cohen, supra note 68, at 35-38, for a case study of the reporting and monitoring
procedures of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
132. Cohen, supra note 68, at 93 ("Even though one might be tempted to assert
that, because of its near universal acceptance as a legal norm, the right of the child
to respect for his or her human dignity is now approaching a status ofjus cogens, the
theory of the rights of the child continues to be in a state of evolution.").
133. Glut, supra note 12, at 1215.
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III. OBSTACLES TO INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
A. POVERTY AND THE CHILD
A variety of factors conspires to make the formulation and
application of international standards in child labor difficult.
Perhaps the most significant of these is the degree of poverty
that generates child labor. Poverty provides a potent argument
against the application of uniform standards for all situations.
There are times when children work in order to eat.'34
Sometimes, children work in order to afford their attendance at
school.'35 In some cases, schooling may not be available, or the
available education is so substandard that it is useless as a
preparation for adult occupation.'3 6 Under these circumstances,
parents and their children often make a calculated decision that
the children are better off working.'37 The sweatshop job may in
fact be highly desirable in comparison to the alternatives.'3 8
In this situation, implementing standards that will throw
children out of work is counterproductive and resented. For
example, in 1993 an estimated 55,000 children in Bangladesh
lost their jobs because the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers
134. Nicole J. Krug, Note, Exploiting Child Labor: Corporate Responsibility and
the Role of Corporate Codes of Conduct, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 651, 654 (1998)
(citing Nomi Morris & Suzanne Goldenberg, Kids at Work: Child Labor is on the Rise
as Countries Rush into the Global Economy, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 11, 1995, at 29).
135. Ben White, Globalization and the Child Labor Problem, 8 J. INT'L DEV. 829,
832 (1996).
136. Id.
137. PATRICK MACKLEM & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, FED. LAB. STANDARDS REV.,
NEW LABOUR STANDARDS COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES: CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
AND SOCIAL LABELING PROGRAMS, 27-28 (2006) ("[A] blanket ban on the use of child
labour in certain developing economies, without accompanying offsetting measures,
might reduce the livelihood of the most vulnerable families who depend on their
child's income."); Jaffe & Weiss, supra note 16, at 895 ("[plutting children to work
should be construed as a rational household decision given the available alternatives
and should therefore be excluded from the realm of normative or ethical judgments."
(quoting Robert Crawford, Soccer Balls Made for Children by Children? Child Labor
in Pakistan, INSEAD 5, available at www.hec.unil.ch/ocadot/CASES/soccer-case
.doc)).
138. White, supra note 135, at 832:
Although we read in the media mainly about children working under
conditions approaching slavery in workshops and factories producing for
export markets, the most common form of children's work, worldwide, is
not in the 'commercial' sector at all, but the unpaid labour of children
working for their parents, whether in housework, the family farm or some
other family enterprise. This form of child labour is scarcely touched by
international or national child labour regulations, but it is often to escape
this form of unpaid work that children enter the labour 'market'.
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and Exporters Association feared an international boycott of
their products, if its membership did not conform to
Bangladeshi law prohibiting the employment of children under
fifteen.'39 An ILO-UNICEF follow-up study showed that few of
these children went back to school. Some of them turned to
even less remunerative and harder work in the domestic
sector.' Others never found work. 4 ' The terminations elicited
a petition from one hundred of the very children they were
meant to protect, asking their employers not to dismiss them,
but "to allow us to continue our light work for 5-6 hours a day
and give us an opportunity to attend school for two to three
hours a day."'42
B. CHEAP LABOR AND PROTECTIONISM
As the WTO controversy above indicates, developing
countries argue that they cannot compete against the developed
countries on the world market unless they take advantage of
cheap labor. Since the developing countries are in the best
position to assess their economic circumstances, the argument
goes, it should be up to them, and not to their wealthier
competitors, to decide what standards to apply.'4 3
These economic considerations shade into the political
differences between developed and developing countries. Among
developing countries, it is common to regard the solicitude of
developed countries for children as a form of hypocrisy that
masks self-interested protectionism.'44 The imposition of labor
139. Id. at 833; APPAREL INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 7.
140. White, supra note 135, at 833.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Holley, supra note 12, at Dl ("Developing countries fear that rich countries'
expressions of concern for the welfare of oppressed workers in the poorer nations are
actually no such thing, but rather are disguised attempts at throwing up trade
barriers against products from such nations.").
144. Mansoor, supra note 86, at 506, argues that protectionist motives for
banning child labor are ill-conceived, that it is hypocritical for countries such as the
United States to sanction developing countries for child labor when the United
States itself has not completely eradicated child labor, and that such sanctions are
often arbitrarily imposed. See Gwynne Dyer, Editorial, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 12, 1996, at All:
Any attempt by the WTO to overstep the legitimate boundaries of trade
and invade the domestic production system is bound to create serious
problems,' said India's commerce minister, B.B. Ramaiah, denouncing core
labor standards as merely the mask for a plan to undermine the
competitive advantages that developing countries enjoy because their labor
is cheaper.
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standards in developing countries would raise the price of their
exports, diminish their competitiveness, and thereby subsidize
the high wages of the developed nations.'45  Whereas the
industrial nations historically made ample use of child labor in
building up their economies to the point where they could afford
restrictions on child labor, the imposition of such laws on
countries that have not yet reached that stage of development
would condemn them to forever remain economically
disadvantaged. 46
C. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: PARENTAL RIGHTS
Social and cultural differences also divide countries in their
attitudes towards child labor. What is a child? "[N]o universal
definition of a child exists; in some nations, childhood ends at
age thirteen, while in others it continues through the age of
fifteen."'4 7  In many societies, the child is thought of as a
resource who owes a duty of obedience to his or her parents and
has an obligation to help the family financially. 48 In virtually
145. MACKLEM & TREBILCOCK, supra note 137, at 10 ("Business leaders who
voice commitments to good corporate citizenship rarely demand the removal of
domestic barriers to competition in their own industries."); Devinder Sharma,
Labour Standards or Double Standards, BUSINESS LINE (THE HINDU), March 17,
1997, at 16, is typical, "[Clommerce rather than altruism seems to be behind the
international concern for the plight of unorganised labour."
146. Glut, supra note 12, at 1208:
[p]roponents of this view [that child labor is necessary for a developing
country to survive in the global market] argue that developed countries
such as the United States have, at some time in the past, made use of child
labor. Because developing countries cannot keep pace with more developed
countries in areas such as technology, employing cheap labor-including
that performed by children-is the only way those countries can remain
competitive.
See also Mansoor, supra note 86, at 6. A similar point might be made about
international regulations on the environment. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 135 (Cornell Univ. Press 1992):
[w]ealthy countries have long had the luxury of affluence by engaging in
activities that now appear to be the main causes of environmental damage.
They were able to achieve relatively high standards of living without
having to internalize the costs of environmental harm in any way. Today's
poorer countries bent on moving into the mainstream of the global economy
can often ill afford the costs that regulation would add to their attempts to
industrialize.
147. Glut, supra note 12, at 1216.
148. Id. at 1209:
many societies view child labor as a way of life. Such societies believe that
a child will develop a skill by working at a young age, and that this skill
will lead to learning a trade that will support the child throughout life. In
Africa, people look upon child labor as a form of education that initiates the
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all societies, there is likely to be some degree of resistance to the
intrusion of the state, let alone the international community, in
matters affecting the family.
The idea of creating universal rights for children also
presents the possibility of a conflict with parental rights. As it
happens, parental rights are not as much of a preoccupation
with developing countries as they are with the United States.
When Hillary Rodham Clinton announced that the United
States would sign the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, social conservatives argued that enforcement of the
Convention would intrude upon the parent-child relationship
and weaken the authority of parents. 49 The American objection
maintains its force under the Bush administration to this day.
As a result, the United States is the only country in the world,
aside from Somalia, yet to have ratified the Convention.5 '
Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that there is
an element of sovereignty within the family concerning the
upbringing and treatment of children, and states are limited in
their ability to intrude on this sovereignty because of almost
universally recognized parental rights concerning the
upbringing of children. To the extent that international law
seeks to protect the rights of children, international law must
not only contend with an intrusion upon state sovereignty, but
with an intrusion upon the parental sovereignty, which many
states have preferred to leave intact. Though states have
child into a path of communal life and work, a path that African society
values highly. Many Asian societies believe that 'children should work to
develop a sense of responsibility and develop a career, rather than become
street urchins and beggars . . . . ' Likewise, Pakistani parents push their
children into work at a young age to avoid vagrancy. Throughout India,
children's participation in work is entirely consistent with the indigenous
cultural tradition, because work has always been an important socializing
device. Regardless of whether or not these beliefs are sound, they remain
prevalent among certain societies.
See also FYFE, supra note 3, at 2-6, 16 ("At the first UN Seminar on Child Labour,
delegates from developing countries stressed that this type of work expressed family
solidarity and therefore was not subject to exploitative relationships.").
149. See John F. Harris, U.S. to Sign U.N. Pact on Child Rights, WASH. POST,
Feb. 11, 1995, at A3 (stating that the decision to sign the Convention will provoke "a
possible ratification battle in the Senate with conservatives") cited in Martha
Minnow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights? 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267 n.2
(1995).
150. See Status of Ratification, supra note129; see also Mary Jo Anderson, Bush
Team Signals New U.N. Direction: Decries 'Erosion of Parental Authority' in
Internationalization of Family Policy, WORLDNETDAILY, Feb. 2, 2001, available at
http://wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=21590; see also Jaya Dayal, U.S.
Children, U.N. Convention Gets U.S. Support, INT'L PRESS SERV., Feb. 16, 1995,
cited in Minnow, supra note 149, at 267 n.2.
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allowed international law to intrude upon their sovereignty in
the area of human rights, 5 ' it is not at all clear that states will
allow international law to influence parental prerogatives as
well.
D. THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
These cultural differences aside, the very concept of
"children's rights" is fraught with difficulty. Children, as
opposed to adults, may be entitled to "developmental" rights,
such as the right to education, play, and leisure in order to
develop to their full potential.' To implement these rights, one
may speak of the right of children to be free from abusive labor
exploitation. But this is not a classical political right, like
freedom of speech, of the press, or of worship. Nor is it exactly
an economic right, like the right to work, or the right to a decent
wage. The right of children to be free from exploitation is
actually the right to be prohibited from working even if the child
wants to work, and the right to be required to go to school even
if the child does not want to go to school.
"Developmental rights" are peculiar in that possessing such
rights implies limitations rather than freedom. Such rights
have the effect of subordinating children to adults in a way that
no adult is subordinated, except for the slave. The comparison
between the legal and social situation of slaves and exploited
children is provocative. Like slaves, children usually have little
choice about working. Just as slaves are under the legal
protection and control of their slave master, children are under
the legal protection and control of their parents, families, or
guardians. Children generally have a reduced bundle of civil
rights. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., for instance, the Supreme Court
found that schools did not need probable cause, but only a
reasonable suspicion, in order to search students.'53 In Bethel
School District v. Fraser, the Court found that schools may
censor the speech of students in order to maintain school
decorum.'54 In the context of educating the child, such a
151. Rudolf Bernhardt, Domestic Jurisdiction of States and International
Human Rights Organs, 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 205 (1986-87) traces the expansion of
international law to include human rights in spite of state sovereignty. Id. at 206.
("The protection of human rights is no longer exclusively within the domestic
jurisdiction of States."). See also Felix Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic
Jurisdiction (Article 2, § 7, of the Charter), 124 RECUEIL DES COURS 371, 431 (1968).
152. Minnow, supra note 149, at 296.
153. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
154. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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diminution in a child's rights may be in the best interests of the
child. But in a context that exploits child labor, a reduction in
rights only makes it easier to treat the child as a slave.
Children are generally considered incompetent to advocate
for their own rights. In this regard, children must be
distinguished from racial or ethnic minorities, and from women,
the disabled, homosexuals, and any other group of competent
adults whose rights have been subject to abuse. All of these
groups consist of adults who, as mature human beings, can
advocate for their respective rights. The past century has
witnessed a strong awareness of the injustice of racial
discrimination. 55 That has led to greater civil rights for racial
and ethnic minorities in many countries on the domestic level
and decolonization on the international level. The black African
nations and minorities were in a position to focus and galvanize
worldwide opposition to the persistent racial discrimination of
South Africa by advocating the application of boycotts,
embargoes, and protests. Even minorities who do not have their
own nations, like the Palestinians and the Kurds, can still
provide advocates that will plead their causes in various
national and international fora.
Women, of course, do not have a separate nation, but their
growing participation in the political, economic, and social
activities of various nations has led to progress in recognizing
the rights of women and their particular social, economic, and
health concerns. Though women's rights may to some extent
overlap with the rights of the children they care for, the two are
not equivalent. Mothers can exploit children as well as
fathers.'56 An increasing ability to participate and advocate is
available for the disabled, homosexuals, and other groups of
competent adults. 157
155. Ermacora, supra note 151, at 427, points out, "It must not be overlooked
that the [U.N.] Charter contains at least one specific provision concerning the
protection of human rights, apart from the provisions concerning self-determination.
This provision is the prohibition of discrimination." Ermacora goes on to
demonstrate how this one area of human rights trumped the claims of state
sovereignty advanced by South Africa. Id. at 434.
156. Consider Minnow's discussion, supra note 149, at 284-86, on the failure of
the feminist movement to fight sufficiently hard enough for children's rights.
157. The gay rights movement became international in scope during the second
half of the twentieth century with the establishment of organizations such as the
International Lesbian and Gay Association. See http://www.ilga.org/. There has
been a similar international establishment of organizations for disabled persons
such as International Disability Alliance. See http://www.internationaldisability
alliance.org/. On March 30, 2007, the United Nations opened the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities for signature. See http://www.un.org/disabilities/.
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The very notion of a child advocating for the rights of
children will strike many in positions of power as risible simply
due to the immaturity and lack of experience of children. In
1996, the television program 60 Minutes broadcasted a feature
about a twelve-year-old Canadian boy, Craig Kielburger, who
founded a group known as Free the Children and traveled to
several countries to investigate child labor.'58 Having collected
thousands of signatures calling for an import ban on products
made with child labor, Kielburger held several news conferences
in which he requested a meeting to discuss the subject with the
Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien.'59 The Prime Minister
ignored Kielburger until newspapers picked up the story.'6 °
Disregard is one way in which a child activist may be
treated. But there are other ways. Kielburger started his
activism after hearing the tragic story of Iqbal Masih, another
twelve-year-old crusader against child labor in Pakistan, who
was shot to death as he rode his bicycle.'61
Children, then, are largely dependent on adults to advocate
for their rights. In this respect, their situation is potentially
little better than that of slaves whose treatment and well-being
depend on the humanitarian character of their masters. It is
unsurprising that in the absence of enforceable standards
upholding the dignity of the child, predators exploit children for
sex, 162 and homeless children die in the streets like stray dogs
There are also many organizations that advocate for children such as UNICEF. See
http://www.unicef.org/. But, children must depend on adults to administer these
organizations and to advocate and develop policy. Although organizations for gay
and disabled persons may be open to anyone, gay and disabled persons are not
subject to a similar dependency. There are, however, some developments in
empowering children in the labor context. See The End of Child Labor, supra note
40, at 35, 41, & 73.
158. Clint O'Connor, Teen Activist Makes World Heed His Cause, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 15, 1997, available at 1997 WLNR 6375811; Mike McDaniel, '60
Minutes' to Focus on Young Crusader from Canada, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 20,
1996, at 3.
159. Teen Activist, supra note 158; Michele Landsberg, Boy, 12, Takes OFL by
Storm with Child Labor Plea, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 26, 1995, at Al.
160. Teen Activist, supra note 158.
161. Death of a Young Crusader, Boy Who Fought Exploiters of Child Labor in
Pakistan Is Slain, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr., 19, 1995, at 1A. Members of the
carpet industry had made many threats against Masih for his activities which had
led to the closure of dozens of carpet-weaving factories. Id. The murderers were
never found. See id. Ehsan Ullah Khan, the chairman of the Bonded Labor
Liberation Front, believes that Masih's death was a conspiracy of the carpet
manufacturers. Id. But no evidence has ever been found to support these claims. See
id.
162. U.N. Child. Fund [UNICEF], The Progress of Nations: The Nations of the
World Ranked According to Their Achievements in Child Health, Nutrition,
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and cats.'63 These phenomena are interrelated. In the presence
of the lesser abuse of exploitation, the others are likely to
become more common. The powerlessness of children to
advocate for themselves forms the greatest obstacle to achieving
progress in children's rights.
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO CORPORATE CODES
OF CONDUCT
A. THE AMERICAN NORTH VS. SOUTH
It is, of course, a treacherous enterprise to seek a solution to
modern problems through historical analogies. It may be
equally treacherous, however, to ignore history altogether.
Consider the following quotation: "We cannot possibly gravitate
from a condition of agriculturalism to a condition of
industrialism without the employment of minors."" This
statement was not made in recent times by an official from a
developing country. It is taken instead from the testimony of
Lewis Parker, a South Carolina cotton mill owner, before the
House of Representatives Committee on Labor in 1914, on
legislation that would outlaw the use of child labor in the
United States.'6 5
Even today, stories surface in the United States about child
labor among migrant workers, in the garment industry, retail,
and construction. 66 At the turn of the twentieth century, the
Education, Family Planning, and Progress for Women, 1994, 36-39, (1994) (Peter
Adamson, ed.) (providing data on child sexual exploitation in various countries);
O'Rourke von Struensee, supra note 65, at 613 n.168 (citing an interview with
Marcus Halevi, a UNICEF photojournalist). Describing the child sex business in
Thailand, Halevi relates how recruiters sell children to hundreds of brothels in
Thailand. The girls work from 9:00 AM to 1:00 AM and serve as many as fifteen
customers during that time. Chiang Rai is a northern city that serves as a central
dispatch point for girls from the surrounding villages. In the railroad yard
recruiters buy, trade, and barter children. Sex tours are arranged out of Munich.
There is also a Japanese owned and operated sex tour hotel in Bangkok.
163. O'Rourke von Struensee, supra note 65, at 617 n.190 (citing Anthony Swift,
UNICEF INT'L CHILD DEV. CTR., BRAZIL: THE FIGHT FOR CHILDHOOD IN THE CITY
(1991)); The Murder of Street Children in Rio De Janeiro, 9 INT'L CHILDREN'S RTS.
MONITOR (1993) (recounting the death of 306 street children by authorities).
164. Quoted in Weissman, supra note 3, at 1.
165. Child Labor Bill: Hearing on H.R. 12292 Before the H. Comm. on Labor,
63d Cong. 95 (1914) (statement of Lewis W. Parker, cotton manufacturer,
Greenville, South Carolina).
166. FYFE, supra note 3, at 62-67; MILTON MELTZER, CHEAP RAW MATERIAL 85-
119 (Viking 1994); Glut, supra note 12, at 1205.
[Vol. 17:1
GLOBAL LABOR REFORM
exploitation of child labor in parts of the United States was
comparable in its extremity to situations that exist in parts of
the developing world today.'67 Congress attempted to control
child labor by passing the Child Labor Act in 1916.' The act
would have banned interstate commerce of products from mines
and quarries in which children under the age of sixteen worked,
or products from other factories in which children under
fourteen worked, or in which children between fourteen and
sixteen worked for more than eight hours a day.'69 In 1918,
however, the United States Supreme Court held, in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, that Congress had no power under the Constitution
to regulate child labor. 7'
Congress thought the issue so important that in 1924 it
passed a constitutional amendment, the Child Labor
Amendment, which provided, "The Congress shall have power to
limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen
years of age.''1. The Amendment never received the
endorsement of three-quarters of the states.' In 1938,
however, the U.S. Congress successfully legislated against child
labor by passing the Fair Labor Standards Act,' which the
Supreme Court upheld under the power of the interstate
commerce clause in United States v. Darby, in effect overturning
Hammer.'74
The difficulty of passing a federal child labor law in the
United States anticipated to some extent the difficulties of
establishing and enforcing such a regulation at the
international level. Following Reconstruction, the states of the
American South were far less industrialized than those of the
North. Recovering from a slave-dependent economy, the sudden
abolition of that economy, and the effects of the Civil War, the
South desperately needed to industrialize in order to compete
with the North. Child labor provided a cheap means to that
167. EDWIN MARKHAM ET AL., CHILDREN IN BONDAGE (1914) (containing
numerous such accounts of child labor abuses in the United States in the early
twentieth century), cited in Glut, supra note 12, at 1205; FYFE, supra note 3, at 28-
33, 57-62.
168. Child Labor Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
169. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268 n.1 (1918), overruled in part by
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (quoting the relevant passage of the
statute).
170. Id.
171. V. Nathaniel Ang, Teenage Employment Emancipation and the Law, 9 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 389, 402 (2007).
172. Id.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2000).
174. Darby, 312 U.S. 100.
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end. Whereas the wealthier states in the North could afford to
prohibit child labor, the poorer states of the South claimed they
could not.'75 On the other hand, if child labor could continue in
some states, and not others, then those states that tolerated
child labor would have an economic advantage over those that
did not, a situation that would inhibit child labor reform in the
wealthy as well as the poor states, resulting eventually in the
economic race to the bottom.'76
The frustration of changing this status quo is evident from
the attempts Congress made to pass a statute and then an
amendment on child labor. It was during this period, when
regulatory law that could provide a national solution to the child
labor problem was not forthcoming, that precursors to the
modern corporate codes of conduct appeared. 177 As Macklem
and Trebilcock point out, such codes are not new.178 In 1899,
"various apparel companies in the United States agreed to
175. For an account of the economic conditions in the American South that
contributed to the exploitation of child labor, see STEPHEN B. WOOD,
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 6-
10 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1968).
The Civil War, which had accelerated northern industrial expansion, left
the south virtually in ruins, and the region sought to restore its
prosperity[-] its very life[-]by establishing a viable system of agriculture
that 'integrated' white labor and colored freedman, and by turning[-
]where its capital resources were sufficient or northern financing was
available[-]to manufacturing.
176. Id. at 25:
[niot only was there great variation in legislation, but some states[-
]especially those of the southern piedmont area[-]lagged far behind the
general level of regulation. The economic and competitive advantages
supposedly (and often actually) enjoyed by backward states tended to
retard reform efforts in almost every state in which manufacturing was of
any importance.
177. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, BY THE SWEAT AND
TOIL OF CHILDREN, VOL. IV: CONSUMER LABELS AND CHILD LABOR 4-9 (1997),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat4/welcome.html,
(providing a brief history of labeling programs which originated in the U.S. during
the late nineteenth century, long before national legislation prohibiting child labor
took effect). In a labeling program, a labor advocacy organization persuades a
manufacturer to agree to maintain labor standards in return for the right to attach
the organization's label to the manufacturer's products. See MACKLEM &
TREBILCOCK, supra note 137 at 4-5, 20-21. The label is a guarantee to the consumer
that the products were ethically manufactured. In effect, the manufacturer
voluntarily adopts the standards or code of the labeling program. In 1898, the
National Consumers League persuaded seventeen clothing manufacturers to adopt
its labor standards to qualify for the "White Label." 4 SWEAT AND TOIL, supra note
177 at 7-8. Among other things, these standards prohibited the employment of
children under fourteen years of age. Id.
178. MACKLEM & TREBILCOCK, supra note 137, at 13.
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comply with safe labour conditions and be inspected by the
National Consumers League (NCL), entitling them to advertise
the NCL's 'White Label' on their garments." ' 9 Even before the
NCL, the New York City League developed a "white list" that
informed consumers about conditions in retail stores.'80 In the
absence of federal law to regulate child labor, these efforts relied
upon consumer activism to pressure manufacturers not to
exploit child labor. These measures were also likely to generate
debate and eventually build a consensus on the need to reform
until such time as the government found a way to address child
labor. This national process to regulate child labor may hold
lessons as codes of conduct emerge as a means of reducing child
labor today at the international level."'
B. PAST MODEL CODES
There have been several modern attempts to regulate labor
through codes of conduct. These include the following.
1. The Sullivan Principles for South Africa
In 1971, the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a Philadelphia
clergyman and member of the board of General Motors,
developed a set of principles as a guide for corporations that did
business under the apartheid regime in South Africa." 2
Sullivan had consulted with religious and labor leaders in South
Africa who believed that constructive engagement with foreign
investors was preferable to disinvestment.'8 3  Constructive
engagement, Sullivan thought, would raise the quality of life for
black South Africans, help them to obtain education, and
179. Id. at 13 n.28 (citing 4 SWEAT AND TOIL, supra note 177).
180. Id.
181. For an example of this type of analysis, see Michele D'Avolio, Child Labor
and Cultural Relativism: From 19th Century America to 21st Century Nepal, 16
PACE INT'L L. REV. 109 (2004).
182. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 666-67; Douglass
Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution? 19 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1963, 1970-71 (1996); Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International
Respect for Worker Rights Through Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1, 5-9 (1993) (citing Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, Sullivan Principles for U.S.
Corporations Operating in South Africa, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1496 (1985)).
183. Perez-Lopez, supra note 182, at 6 (citing Reverend Leon Sullivan, Agents
for Change: The Mobilization of Multinational Companies in South Africa, 15 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 427, 427-28 (1983)); Leon H. Sullivan, The Sullivan Principles and
Change in South Africa, AFRICA REPORT 48 (May-June 1984); Leon H. Sullivan, The
Sullivan Principles and Change in South Africa, in BUSINESS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 175 (Herbert L. Sawyer ed., 1988).
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eventually overcome the barriers of apartheid, while
disinvestment would only put South Africans, especially non-
white South Africans, out of work. Twelve U.S. firms, including
General Motors, immediately adopted the Sullivan Principles,
and by 1986, approximately 200 of the 260 U.S. corporations
doing business in South Africa had adopted them. 84  The
Sullivan Principles included commitments to racially non-
discriminatory employment, wages, access to management
programs, supportive services, affirmative action, and the use of
corporate influence to end apartheid.'85 Each Sullivan firm's
performance was to be monitored by an independent accounting
firm, Arthur D. Little.'86  By 1987, however, the Reverend
Sullivan himself declared his Principles a failure, largely due to
the intransigence of the South African government on the
question of apartheid.'8 7 Apartheid eventually fell not because
of the Sullivan Principles, but rather because of corporate
disinvestment and international sanctions against South Africa.
In spite of Sullivan's ultimate rejection of his Principles,
there is evidence that they did some good. The Sullivan
Principles resulted in the desegregation of hundreds of
enterprises, education, and job training for approximately
50,000 workers a year, and significant investment in the
infrastructure of black and desegregated education in South
Africa.'88 The Principles increased the number of non-white
managers, placed them in positions supervising whites, inspired
other countries to establish similar codes for their corporations
operating in South Africa, and promoted the growth of black
trade unions.'89  A study also showed that the Sullivan
companies as a group out-performed the Dow Jones Industrial
Average in average return on equity from 1977 to 1983.19°
184. Cassel, supra note 182, at 1970 (citing Patricia Arnold and Theresa
Hammond, The Role of Accounting in Ideological Conflict: Lessons from the South
African Divestment Movement, 19 ACCT., ORGS., AND SOC. 111, 116 (1994)).
185. Perez-Lopez, supra note 182, at 6-9.
186. Arnold & Hammond, supra note 184, at 114.
187. Id. at 118.
188. Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: the Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights
through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 111, 123 (1998) (quoting
Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 153, 175 (1997)).
189. Liubicic, supra note 188, at 123-24 (citing Perez-Lopez, supra note 182, at
43).
190. JILL MURRAY, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, BUREAU FOR




Hence, investing in the ethically sound Sullivan companies was
also financially sound. Perhaps the most important effect of the
Sullivan Principles was the demonstration that such ethical
schemes were possible and worthwhile.' 9
2. The MacBride Principles in Northern Ireland
During the troubles of Northern Ireland in the mid-1980's,
the Irish statesman Sean MacBride developed the MacBride
Principles to ensure that U.S. companies would provide equal
treatment to Catholic workers in Protestant-dominated
Northern Ireland. Here there was no interest in
disinvestment.'9 2 These principles included commitments of
non-discrimination, affirmative action, and protection of the
workers both at the workplace and while traveling to and from
work.'93 Though opponents claimed the Principles' restrictions
and vague standards discouraged investment, in 1998, the U.S.
Congress amended the Anglo-Irish Support Act of 1986,
introducing the "Principles of Economic Justice" as a
requirement for the disbursement of U.S. funds to the
International Fund for Ireland.'94 These Principles are virtually
identical to the MacBride Principles.'9 5 Several states and cities
have also adopted them.'96 These institutions can leverage their
huge pension funds and thereby place effective pressure on
corporations to follow these Principles.197
3. The Slepak and Miller Codes
The Slepak Principles, named in honor of a Soviet dissident
191. Id.
192. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 671-72; Cassel, supra
note 182, at 1971; Perez-Lopez, supra note 182, at 9-12 (citing SEAN MACBRIDE, THE
MACBRIDE PRINCIPLES (Irish National Caucus, Wash. D.C., 1984)). For biographical
information, see William G. Blair, Sean MacBride of Ireland is Dead at 83, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1988, at 10.
193. Perez-Lopez, supra note 182, at 10-12.
194. Kathleen P. Lundy, Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland: An Economic
Resolution to a Political and Religious Conflict, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POLVY 699, 729-31 n.148 (2001) (citing Pub. L. Nos. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-2851
(adopted Oct. 21, 1998) (§ 2811 amending the Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-415)).
195. Id. at 730 n. 149 (providing the text of the Principles of Economic Justice).
196. Cassel, supra note 182, at 1972.
197. Father Sean McManus, The MacBride Principles: The Essence (2001),
http://www.irishnationalcaucus.org/pagesMacBride[MacBride%20Principles%2OThe
%20Essence.htm (making this point about pension funds and lists cities, states, and
prominent politicians who have supported the MacBride Principles).
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and promulgated in 1988 by a private foundation, were designed
to provide a code of conduct for multinational companies doing
business in the Soviet Union.19 The Miller Principles, contained
in a 1991 bill introduced by a U.S. Congressman, John Miller,
sought to do the same for China.199 In view of the dissolution of
the Soviet Union and corporate interest in investment in China,
however, neither has attracted much attention."'
4. The Maquiladora Code
The AFL-CIO and a coalition of religious and environmental
groups issued the Maquiladora Standards of Conduct, which
appeal to U.S. companies to maintain a healthy environment,
safe workplace, and adequate standard of living for workers,
especially in the factory zone along the border with Mexico." 1
The Maquiladora Code requires disclosure to workers and
communities about the risks of chemicals and hazardous
materials, calls for workplace health and safety committees, the
right to organize, a minimum wage, limits on work hours,
improvements in housing, health care, sanitary services for
workers, and prohibits discrimination.0 2 As of mid-1994, only
one company, Asarco, had signed on to this Code.0 3
5. Rugmark
To combat the widespread problem of child labor in the
carpet industry of south Asia, an Indian child labor activist,
Kailash Satyarthi, founded the Rugmark Foundation with the
help of the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude, the Indo-
German Promotion Council, UNICEF, and other concerned
198. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 672; Perez-Lopez, supra
note 182, at 12-16. See S. 1018, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), and H.R. 2366, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
199. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 672; Perez-Lopez, supra
note 182, at 16-19 (citing H.R. 1571, 102d Cong. lst Sess. (1991)).
200. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 672.
201. Id. at 672-73; Perez-Lopez, supra note 182, at 19-23 (citing COALITION FOR
JUSTICE IN THE MAQUILADORAS, INTRODUCTION TO MAQUHADORA STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT, § 1 (1991)). Perez-Lopez explains, "Maquiladoras are factories located in
Mexico along the U.S.-Mexico border that specialize in assembling U.S.-made parts
and components into finished products that are then sold in the United States." Id.
at 20 n.66.
202. Perez-Lopez, supra note 182, at 20-23.
203. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 673 (citing Activists
Reached a Variety of Agreements in Withdrawing All 10 Maquiladora Resolutions,
NEWS FOR INVESTORS (Investor Responsibility Research Center) May 1992, at 15).
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industry and nongovernment groups.2" Rugmark is a labeling
program. Carpet retailers and manufacturers agree to abide by
the Rugmark code of conduct that provides for the replacement
of child labor with adult labor and for the education of the
children. Signatories pay a licensing fee and are subject to
inspection by Rugmark monitors. Those who pass the
inspection may attach the Rugmark label to their products,
which signifies that the carpet was not produced with child
labor."5 In Germany, which is an import center for carpets from
Asia, carpet wholesalers and retailers who agree to buy only
Rugmark-certified products are permitted to publicize the fact
and use the label. 6  In 1994, the U.S.-based Child Labor
Coalition established the Rugmark Foundation to promote the
U.S. Consumer Education Campaign for Rugmark. °7 Rugmark
also rescues children from exploitative labor situations and
places them in schools.0 ' The movement has been successful in
Germany and is gaining popularity in the United States."9
6. FIFA
Child labor is a serious problem in the manufacture of
soccer balls.1  In 1996, the F6d6ration Internationale de
204. See the Rugmark Foundation website, http://www.rugmark.org; How to
Become Licensed by Rugmark (including information about the licensing process,
fees, and a License Agreement Overview), http://www.rugmark.org/index.php?cid=
62; Rugmark License Agreement Request, http://www.rugmark.orgflicense-
agreement.php?cid=91; and Rugmark's Annual Reports 2002-2006 (listing licensed
importers and explaining how Rugmark operates), http://www.rugmark.org/index.
php?cid=16. See also Liubicic, supra note 188, at 129-30 (citing 4 SWEAT AND TOIL,
supra note 177, at 24); and State Department Press Release, News from the
Washington File, Governments, Private Groups Work to End Child Slavery, 2007
WLNR 8975343 (May 11, 2007).
205. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 673; Liubicic, supra
note 188, at 130.
206. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 673 n.40 (citing
Interview with Pharis Harvey, Executive Director, International Labor Rights
Education and Research Fund and Co-Chair, RUGMARK CAMPAIGN (Jan. 13,
1995)).
207. Id. at 673 n.38 (citing CLC Launches RUGMARK Consumer Campaign, 4
CHILD LABOR MONITOR 1-2 (Sept. 1994) (National Consumers League Publication));
see also Child Workers in Asia, The Rugmark Campaign, 11 CHILD WORKERS IN ASIA
NEWSLETTER (Apr.-Sept. 1995), http://www.cwa.tnet.co.th/Publications/Newsletters/
vol 1_ 2-3/vl1 -2-_rugmark.html.
208. Rugmark Foundation, Schools and Opportunities, http://www.rugmark.org/
index.php?cid=14.
209. Liubicic, supra note 188, at 130; see Rugmark in the News,
http://www.rugmark.org/in-the-news.php?cid=14, for news articles about the
Rugmark Foundation.
210. Sydney H. Schanberg and Jimmie Briggs, Six Cents an Hour, LIFE, June,
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Football Association (FIFA), a Swiss organization that oversees
the sport of soccer, reached an agreement with international
unions to incorporate child labor standards into FIFA's
regulatory system." ' In order to attach the FIFA label to soccer
balls, a manufacturer now not only had to meet FIFA's
regulations as to the size, weight, and durability of the soccer
ball, but also had to certify that the manufacturer was in
compliance with ILO conventions, which include a ban on child
labor."2  In 2002, however, nongovernmental organization
(NGOs) reported that manufacturers using the FIFA logo were
violating the FIFA code on a massive scale, including violations
of child labor.2 3  FIFA itself acknowledges the difficulty of
addressing the problem of child labor.1 4 In 2003, FIFA joined
the ILO in a renewed effort to combat child labor in the
manufacture of sports equipment called "The Red Card to Child
Labor.""2 5
7. Social Accountability 8000
In 1997, The Council on Economic Priorities and
Accreditation Association (CEPAA)26  created Social
Accountability 8000 (SA 8000).17 This is a certification program
that provides a code of standards to measure the performance of
MNCs in several areas, including child labor. The SA 8000 code
is based on international workplace norms such as ILO
Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
1996, at 38.
211. Liubicic, supra note 188, at 130-31 (citing 4 SWEAT AND TOIL, supra note
177, at 118).
212. Id.
213. Berne Declaration, Fair-Play Campaign 2002, FIFA Tolerates Massive
Violations of Labor Rights: Statement of the Clean Clothes Campaign and the Global
March Against Child Labor, May 28, 2002, http://www.evb.ch/en/p25001374.html.
214. FIFA, Child Labor, "Child labour is a complex socio-political phenomenon
and as such, it is extremely difficult to combat. As a sporting organisation, FIFA
has neither the experience nor the means to eradicate this wide-reaching problem on
its own." http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/worldwideprograms/footballforhope/
campaigns/childlabour.html.
215. FIFA and ILO Join Forces to Fight Child Labor, THE SPORTS NETWORK,
February 13, 2003. Human Rights Education Association, FIFA and ILO Team Up
on Worldwide Campaign to Fight Child Labour, http://www.hrea.org/lists/child-
rights/markup/msg00168.html. The red card in soccer indicates that a player must
leave the game.
216. CEPAA is an American public interest organization that attempts to
improve corporate social responsibility, http://www.cepaa.org.
217. Liubicic, supra note 188, at 126; see Document Library, Social




the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child."' The CEPAA
accredits firms to certify and monitor signatories on the basis of
briefs provided by local unions and human rights organizations
regarding signatory work sites."' Currently SA 8000 certifies
more than 1,300 companies in sixty-three countries and seventy
industries.2 °
8. Model Business Principles and the Apparel Industry
Partnership Code of Conduct
In 1995, the Clinton administration published a model code
to provide guidance to U.S. MNCs in their overseas operations.
It is called the Model Business Principles, and it contains
provisions regarding child labor.2 ' However, there were no
recommendations regarding monitoring or sanctions.222 The
Department of Commerce administered the Principles and, in
cooperation with various nonprofit organizations, created a
clearinghouse to collect and provide information on the codes
adopted by U.S. MNCs.223
The U.S. Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration,
Robert Reich, encouraged the formation of the Apparel Industry
Partnership (AIP).224 This is a coalition of labor, industry,
consumer, and human rights groups formed in 1996 to eliminate
or reduce sweatshop conditions in the globalized apparel
industry.2 In 1997, the AIP created a Workplace Code of
Conduct and urged U.S. clothing manufacturers to adopt it.226
The Code includes Principles of Monitoring that provide for
monitoring by Code signatories and independent external
218. Social Accountability International, Overview of SA8000, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageID=473.
219. Liubicic, supra note 188, at 127 n.92 (citing Deborah Leipziger, Social
Accountability 8000: CEP Accreditation Agency Launches Standard on Workplace
Issues, COUNCIL ON ECON. PRIORITIES RES. REP. 2, 5 (1998)).
220. The Social Accountability International Website, SAI Corporate Programs,
http:/www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=527&
grandparentlD=475&parentlD=747.
221. Cassel, supra note 182, at 1974.
222. Id.
223. Frey, supra note 188, at 173 n.113; Liubicic, supra note 188, at 125 (citing
Administration Releases Details on Voluntary Business Principles, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), May 31, 1995, at A-4).
224. Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the DeCentered
State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 401, 413 n.38 (2001).
225. Liubicic, supra note 188, at 125.
226. Id.
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monitors.22 7 A signatory may choose independent monitors from
a list of organizations that the AIP has approved.2 28
Unfortunately, signatory agreement, rather than proof of
compliance, results in permission to attach the "No Sweat" label
to the signatory's products.229 In 1999, the AIP created the Fair
Labor Association (FLA) to administer this program.2 Aside
from reviewing and monitoring participants, the FLA issues an
Annual Public Report with detailed information from monitored
factories and remediation action plans.' The FLA also has a
third-party complaint procedure and other special projects. 32
V. THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE CODES
A. OF CORPORATIONS, CELEBRITIES, THE MEDIA, AND THE
PUBLIC
During the late 1990s, corporations and celebrities who
sponsored corporate products found that the public had certain
expectations of them. The idea that corporations, whether they
had committed to a corporate code or not, should abide by
certain standards of conduct came to have a certain enforcement
power of its own. It was the media and the public response to
exploitative child labor that produced this result.
1. The Gap
In early 1995, for instance, labor and religious groups
mounted a campaign to protest sweatshop conditions prevalent
in El Salvador among the contractors of the trendy clothing
retailer, the Gap.233 A columnist at the New York Times related
how young teenage girls were paid fifty-six cents an hour, forced
to work eighteen hours a day, had to get tickets from
supervisors to go to the bathroom, and were subject to firing if
227. Id. at 126.
228. Id.
229. Heidi S. Bloomfield, "Sweating" the International Garment Industry: A
Critique of the Presidential Task Force's Workplace Codes of Conduct and Monitoring
System, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 567, 585 (1999).
230. Fair Labor Association Website, Defending Worker's Rights Worldwide,
http://www.fairlabor.org/about/history.
231. Fair Labor Association, 2006 Annual Public Report,
http://www.fairlabor.org/all/2006PublicReport.
232. Id. at 21-22.
233. Bob Herbert, In America: A Sweatshop Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995,
at A39, cited in Cassel, supra note 182, at 1968 n.28.
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they formed a union.234 The Gap responded by suspending the
contractor's orders and sending investigators. Eventually, the
Gap halted all business with the contractor until it met a set of
newly adopted guidelines. Further, the Gap refused to deal
with any other contractors until the government of El Salvador
capably investigated such abuses and resolved the labor
disputes fairly. 35
In March 1996, the Gap established an independent
monitoring system for human rights violations by its
contractors. 36 In an attempt to resolve the conflict, the clothing
retailer agreed with its Salvadoran contractor and local
religious, human rights, and labor organizations to monitor
compliance under its revised and more specific code of
conduct. 37
2. Levi Strauss
In September of 1991, Levi Strauss established a Sourcing
Guidelines Working Group to develop standards for overseas
suppliers not only for ethical reasons, but also to protect the
company's brand image.238  The group reviewed the UN's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international
human rights instruments.2 39 In March 1992, the company
adopted the task force's guidelines after embarrassing media
exposure of labor abuse at a company source factory in Saipan.24 °
The Levi-Strauss code of conduct has two parts.2 ' The first,
234. Bob Herbert, In America: Children of the Dark Ages, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1995, at A25; Bob Herbert, In America: In Deep Denial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at
A33, cited in Cassel, supra note 182, at 1968 nn.29-31; Bob Herbert, In America:
Not a Living Wage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at A17; Bob Herbert, In America:
Sweatshop Beneficiaries, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1995, at A13.
235. Cassel, supra note 182, at 1968-69.
236. Bob Herbert, Righting a Wrong, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 23, 1995, at B6;
Stuart Silverstein, Labor Dept. Adds GAP Inc. to "Good Guy" Retailer List, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1995, at D2; Journal of Commerce, GAP Pressures Suppliers to
Improve Conditions, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 25, 1995, at B9, cited in Cassel, supra
note 182, at 1969 n.33.
237. REVISED RESOLUTION DECLARATION, March 22, 1996, signed by
representatives of Mandarin International, the Archdiocese of San Salvador, the
Human Rights Institute of the University of Central America, Centra (a labor
organization), and the Mandarin Workers' Union (on file with the FORDHAM INT'L.
L.J.), cited in Cassel, supra note 182, at 1969 n.34.
238. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 676.
239. Id.
240. A Stitch in Time, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1992, at 27, cited in Compa &
Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 677 n.54.
241. LEVI STRAUSS & Co., BUSINESS PARTNER TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT AND
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES (1992), in APPAREL INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at
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Business Partner Terms of Engagement, addresses "workplace
issues that are substantially controllable by [the company's]
individual business partners, such as environmental
requirements, ethical, health and safety standards, legal
regulations and employment practice. '  The second part,
Country Assessment Guidelines, entails issues that are
probably beyond the ability of the business partner to control,
but that nevertheless "could subject [the company's] corporate
reputation and therefore [its] business success, to potential
harm." '243 These include health and safety, human rights, legal
requirements, and political or social stability.
The employment practice section includes six specific issues
of employment: wages and benefits, working hours, child labor,
prison/forced labor, discrimination, and disciplinary practices
such as corporal punishment or other forms of coercion.244 It
omits the right to form a union.245 The company has established
an internal monitoring and enforcement system that begins
with a questionnaire on employment practices in foreign plants,
provides for audits, surprise site visits, review by company
personnel, and possible termination of violators' contracts.246
The company rates business suppliers according to a three-
tiered system: contractors who are indifferent or unwilling to
improve unacceptable working conditions are terminated;
contractors who can possibly improve can negotiate a plan and
time-table to resolve the problems; and contractors who could do
more are encouraged to improve.247
At its Saipan contractor, Levi Strauss found virtually slave
labor conditions. Immigrant workers were housed in padlocked
barracks, their passports confiscated during the contract period.
They worked for eleven hours a day, seven days a week, for
$1.65 an hour.248 As a result of its investigation under its
"Terms of Engagement," Levi Strauss canceled its contract with
the Saipan factory owner and with thirty other contractors in
the Philippines, Honduras, and Uruguay while improving
employment practices with one hundred others overseas.249 In
155-57.
242. Id. at 155-56.
243. Id. at 157.
244. Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 677.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 677-78.
247. Id. at 678.
248. A Stitch in Time, supra note 240, at 27.
249. John McCormick & Marc Levinson, The Supply Police, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15,
1993, at 48-49, cited in Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 678-79.
[Vol. 17:1
GLOBAL LABOR REFORM
Bangladesh, Levi Strauss established an innovative program in
two plants where it discovered children under fourteen were
working. In an agreement with local officials, the children
returned to school but continued drawing pay from the
contractor while Levi Strauss paid for their tuition, books, and
uniforms and agreed to offer the children jobs at the plants
when they became fourteen.25 °
In regard to its "Country Assessment Guidelines," Levi
Strauss checked whether any of its facilities in China and
Burma were reported to use prison labor and conducted surprise
visits and inquiries. As a result, the company entirely withdrew
from both countries.25'
3. Kathie Lee Gifford
In May of 1996, talk show host Kathie Lee Gifford felt
vilified after Charles Kernaghan, the executive director of the
National Labor Committee, alleged that exploited child laborers
in Honduras produced her Wal-Mart fashion line. 2  Her first
response was defensive. She declared herself a victim of a
smear campaign and threatened to sue the organization that
accused her of taking advantage of child labor. 253  Eventually,
In 1999, several labor groups, including the Asian Law Caucus, Global Exchange,
Sweatshop Watch of Oakland, and the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile
Employees, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of workers in Saipan against
twenty-seven garment manufacturers and retailers including Levi Strauss. All but
Levi-Strauss settled, paying $6.4 million to the workers. Levi Strauss consistently
claimed it had acted appropriately, and in 2004 the plaintiffs voluntarily dropped
their suit against Levi Strauss. Jenny Strasburg, Levi's Lawsuit Tossed, Saipan
Workers' Case Dismissed in Victory for Clothier, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2004, at B1.
250. Martha Nichols, Third-World Families at Work: Child Labor or Child
Care?, HARv. BUS. REV. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1993), cited in Compa & Hinchliffe-
Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 679; McCormick & Levinson, supra note 249.
251. Amy Borrus and Joyce Barnathan, Stanching the Flow of China's Gulag
Exports, BUs. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 51-52; G. Pascal Zachary, U.S. Companies Back
Out of Burma, Citing Human-Rights Concerns Graft, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1995, at
A10, cited in Compa & Hinchliffe-Derricarrere, supra note 60, at 679 n.62. The
implementation of Levi Strauss's Code not only provides benefits for the company's
brand name, but also helps its foreign business partners. Those who qualify to work
for Levi Strauss can work for anyone in the industry. Richard Rapaport, Import
Jeans, Export Values: What Happens if a Company's Global Reach Exceeds its
Ethical Grasp?, FAST COMPANY, Oct. 1993, cited in Compa & Hinchliffe-
Derricarrere, at 679 n.64.
252. Charles S. Clark, Child Labor and Sweatshops (Outlook section), 6 CQ
RESEARCHER 721 (Aug. 16, 1996), available at http://library.cqpress.coml
cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrrel996081600.
253. Mike Leonard, Stopping Sweatshops Helps Both U.S., Foreign Workers,
BLOOMINGTON HERALD-TIMES (IND.), Nov. 17, 1996, at Cl.
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however, she spoke with one of the children who worked in the
sweatshop that produced the line of clothing bearing her name.
To her credit, Mrs. Gifford began to work with other garment-
endorsing celebrities to organize a July 16 industry summit in
Washington, promoting the Labor Department's "No Sweat"
campaign.254
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT
1. The Department of Labor Apparel Industry Study
In 1996, the U.S. Department of Labor published a report
that broadened the scope of these case studies. It bears the
hopeful title, The Apparel Industry and Codes of Conduct: A
Solution to the International Child Labor Problem?.255 The
report drew on wide-ranging sources, including interviews with
labor ministry officials, manufacturers, plant managers, buyers,
trade associations, unions, workers, community activists,
human rights groups, and NGOs in the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, and the Philippines, and
a survey of codes of conduct from forty-eight American
corporations with interests overseas.256  Though the study
admits that no reliable statistics on the rate of child
employment in any particular economic activity exists, on the
basis of its information, the study concluded that "in some of the
countries examined, fewer children may currently be working on
garment exports for the U.S. market than two years ago." '257 The
report noted the recent emergence of corporate codes of conduct,
the first appearing in 1991, and most others in the previous two
or three years.258 It also noted the variety of forms these codes
take. Aside from special documents providing guidelines, there
are letters stating company policies that are sent to overseas
contractors, compliance questionnaires and certificates required
of suppliers, and clauses in formal documents such as purchase
orders.259 These documents may refer to a minimum age for
workers who make the products, to the national laws of the host
country, and to international standards like ILO Convention
254. Call Her 'Gandhi Lee,'ARiz. REPUBLIC, July 16, 1996, at A3.
255. APPAREL INDUSTRY, supra note 5.
256. Id. at iii.
257. Id. at i.
258. Id. at ii.
259. Id. at 31.
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The Department of Labor study noted a variety of
limitations to which corporate codes of conduct are subject. For
one thing, a corporation's code is likely to have effect only to the
extent that the corporation can exercise influence on the
overseas factory. If the factory is not owned by the corporation,
or if it can find other customers, it is less likely to adhere to the
corporation's rules.261 Sometimes it is difficult to ascertain the
ages of children because records such as birth certificates are
poorly kept or unavailable in the host country.262
Monitoring takes a number of forms, some more likely to
have an effect than others. Some corporations do no more than
include a clause on child labor in their contracts and expect
parties to honor it. 263  Those corporations that monitor
compliance might get information from local organizations, such
as labor unions, if there are any, religious groups, and NGOs. 64
Others might use accounting firms, 265 their own staff,26 6 or rely
on their buying agent. 267  Enforcement may take the form of
screening out some suppliers or terminating contracts, but also
less drastic measures, such as demands for improvement or the
cancellation of certain orders.268 Often the concern about labor
conditions affecting children is secondary to concerns about the
quality of the merchandise. In spite of all this, the main point
260. Id. at 32-39.
261. Id. at 101:
[g]enerally, the closer the relationship between a U.S. company importing
garments and the actual producer of the items, the greater the ability of
the U.S. company to influence labor standards, including prohibitions on
child labor . . . . Conversely, the longer the chain of
procurement/production . . . and the more levels of buying agents,
contractors, and subcontractors, the more complex and challenging is the
implementation of the labor standards policies and the less the ability of
the U.S. importers to influence them.
262. Id. at 82 ("In some countries, birth registries are not common and therefore
there is no demonstrable method to determine age. In other countries, youths below
the legal minimum age procure fraudulent identification cards or fake government
permits required to prove that they have permission to work.").
263. Id. at 61 ("Some companies, particularly retailers, may have general
language in their purchase order or vendor contracts requiring vendors to comply
with applicable laws but have no mechanisms for monitoring compliance.").
264. Id. at 59-60.
265. Id. at 58-59.
266. Id. at 54-57.
267. Id. at 57-58.
268. Id. at 108-11.
269. Id. at 48 ("Monitoring is usually part of a larger process that includes
issues such as quality control and delivery coordination. For this reason, it is not
always clear to what extent site visits focus on the code implementation."); id. at 101
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of the Department of Labor study was that this rather
amorphous form of regulation had some effect in reducing child
labor in the apparel industry and warranted further study,
perhaps even industry-wide standardization in order to increase
its effectiveness.270
President Clinton's announcement in April of 1997 of the
Apparel Industry Partnership's accord among apparel industry,
consumer, and human rights groups provided some of this
standardization. The agreement includes guidelines that
prohibit corporations from employing children under fifteen in
most nations. Additionally, the agreement contains a
declaration of other workers' rights, such as the right to
collective bargaining, a minimum wage, and a sixty-hour
workweek. Corporations that sign this agreement may mark
their products with the words, "No Sweat," to indicate that they
comply with the standards of the accord.27 '
2. Corporate Social Responsibility and Self-Interest
Perhaps the most basic criticism of the idea that corporate
codes can ameliorate exploitative child labor is that such social
altruism is antithetical to the function and nature of a
corporation. Corporations are in the business of making profits,
not establishing social programs. As Adam Smith stated, "[b]y
pursuing his own interest [the individual] frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it. '272 In Milton Friedman's view, doing public good
is the responsibility of government, not business. "[T]here is...
only one social responsibility of business- . . . to increase its
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game .... 273
("While monitoring for product quality, and even for health and safety conditions, is
customary in the garment industry,... monitoring for compliance with provisions of
the codes of conduct of U.S. garment importers dealing with other labor
standards[-]and child labor in particular[-]is not.").
270. Id. at 113-14, 118-19.
271. William Branigin, Clinton, Garment Makers Hail Accord on Sweatshops:
Critics Say Pact Falls Short on Key Work Issues, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1997, at A10;
Steven Greenhouse, Accord to Combat Sweatshop Labor Faces Obstacles, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, § 1, at 1.
272. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS, Book IV, Ch. 2, 181 (R. H. CAMPBELL & A. S. SKINNER eds., Liberty
Fund, Inc. 1976) (1776).
273. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine) at 32, 126; see also William Safire,
Op-Ed., The New Socialism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A13 ("What are the
primary 'social' responsibilities of a corporation? To serve its owners by returning a
profit and its community by paying taxes; to earn the allegiance of customers by
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This particular criticism of corporate codes, however, may
be wide off the mark because the corporate implementation of
the codes does not depend entirely on altruism as its exclusive
motivation. Codes of conduct make economic sense if corporate
management believes that consumers are willing to pay a
premium for products that are made without exploitative child
labor, so that the corporation will enhance its profits by
enhancing its image.274 There is evidence to support consumer
willingness to pay such a premium. According to a survey of
consumers taken in 1995, "78 percent of respondents said that
they would prefer to shop at retail stores that had committed
themselves to ending garment-worker abuse; 84 percent said
they would pay $1 extra on a $20 item to ensure that the
garment had been made in a worker friendly environment." '2 75
As Tim Smith, director of the Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility, put it, corporations have taken an interest in
social responsibility because a small group of individuals
constituting only five percent of consumers are influenced by
political and social concerns. "They're fighting very hard for
every percent of the market so they do pay attention and they do
care very much. 276
3. Reputation and Unpredictability
Consumers, however, may exaggerate their altruism, or
even lie about their willingness to pay a premium to avoid using
products manufactured by poor children. Even if these surveys
are accurate in assessing consumer conduct, consumers may
either lose interest in the issue or not be well-informed about
the products that are or are not made with exploitative child
delivering value; and to provide a secure future for employees who help it succeed in
the marketplace.").
274. MACKLEM & TREBILCOCK, supra note 137, at 22-23.
275. Debora I. Spar, Creating Corporate Social Responsibility, BLUEPRINT
MAGAZINE (June 1, 2001), available at http://www.ppionline.org/ppi-ci.cfm?
knlgAreaJD=l15&subsecD=900026&contentD=964. A survey conducted a year
after Spar's survey found similar results. Vivian Marino, Sweatshops Becoming a
Retail Issue, Stores Finding Themselves Being Held Accountable For Human Rights
Abuses, SUN-SENTINEL (FLA.), June 23, 1996, at 1, in Jaffe & Weiss, supra note 16,
at 908 n.83. Jaffe and Weiss caution that these surveys may overstate consumer
willingness to pay a premium because the economy during the 1990s was good, and
also because the consumers may have exaggerated their altruism. Jaffe & Weiss,
supra note 16, at 908 n.83.
276. Leslie Lindeman, Good Intentions: Letting Your Conscience Be a Shopping
Guide, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1996, § 6, at 1.
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labor.277 The capacity of consumers for consistent and organized
choice is limited. The television series Seinfeld has an episode
that humorously illustrates this point. In the episode, Jerry
Seinfeld's eccentric friend Kramer has a job as a department
store Santa Claus. As Santa Claus, he recommends toys that
are ethically manufactured. He tries to discourage one little boy
from asking for a racing car set which, Kramer claims, was
made by exploited children in Taiwan. This particular boy,
however, insists on the racing car set he originally asked for,
and calls Kramer a "commie," after which Kramer's career as a
department store Santa comes to an abrupt end."
Though public reaction may at times be disappointing, at
other times, public reaction may be surprisingly strong and
effective, as the cases of the Gap, Levi Strauss, and Kathy Lee
Gifford illustrate. This uncertainty of the public's response to
publicity concerning exploitative child labor may actually
contribute to the effectiveness of corporate codes. A high-profile
corporation that either tolerates exploitative child labor in the
manufacture of its products or is negligent about maintaining
standards regarding child labor risks injuring its reputation and
hurting its sales. It is unpredictable whether the media will
expose a particular situation of exploitative child labor or
whether the story will have legs: the public reaction might be
anything from indifference to boycotts. To avoid this risk, it is
prudent to temper the corporate interest in cheap labor with
some solicitude for maintaining labor standards. This would be
particularly true of standards regarding the use of child labor,
since the abusive exploitation of children can potentially
provoke the greatest sympathy and hence the most
unforeseeable and unmanageable public response. The exercise
of discovering whether losses generated by a bad corporate
image will outweigh the gain of exploiting child labor is
probably not worth the risk, since the corporate reputation and
sales contingent upon it, once lost, may prove unrecoverable.
The concern with reputation not only justifies efforts on the
part of the corporations to impose codes of conduct, but also
efforts to enforce them. If a corporation creates a code of
conduct because it does not wish the media to portray it as an
exploitative employer, the corporation is also likely to have some
interest in enforcement of the code, since the bad press will be
worse if the media portrays the corporation as hypocritical in
277. MACKLEM & TREBILCOCK, supra note 137, at 23, 42-43.




publicizing a code that has no real effect.
4. The Flexibility of Corporate Codes
Macklein and Trebilcock point out that corporate codes of
conduct differ profoundly from conventional forms of labor
regulation:
[Ijabour market regulation, traditionally understood, is a blend of
specific rules negotiated by parties-either individually or
collectively-to an employment relationship and general legislative
imperatives that establish baseline entitlements to workers regardless
of their bargaining power. In contrast, codes of conduct and social
labeling programs rely "primarily on the participation and resources of
nongovernmental actors in the construction, operation, and
implementation of a governance agreement.
279
The implementation of codes of conduct does not depend "on
an employment contract, a collective agreement, legislation, or
the common law" to govern relations between employers and
employees.28 Corporate codes depend upon internal or external
monitoring chosen by the corporation itself, and not the state or
government, to insure compliance with any regulations
contained in the code.28" ' Corporate codes rely on the economic
power of the consumer rather than the policing power of the
state to enforce compliance.282 Indeed, much about corporate
codes of conduct "runs counter to the basic tenets of domestic
labour law," which assume that labor agreements are the
product of negotiations between or among the relevant parties
under the rules set by the state.283 This situation subjects the
corporate code regimen to many inadequacies because the
corporation is able to bypass its workers, therefore ignoring
their interests. 28" Because the corporation sets out its own code
and means of monitoring it, the corporation can be arbitrary and
inconsistent in its formulation and enforcement of its own
code. 285  Further, reliance on consumer power for enforcement
means the corporation will often manipulate the codes for
purposes of public relations.286




283. Id. at 24.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 37-39.
286. See Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke & Archon Fung, Ratcheting Labor
Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace 3-4
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Theory Working Paper Group, Paper Nov. 21,
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There may not be any completely satisfactory solutions to
these disadvantages. Commentators recommend, however, that
corporations cooperate and consult with local organizations such
as nongovernmental agencies, religious groups, and the workers
themselves in developing and implementing corporate codes.287
Further, the corporate codes should reference international
agreements such as ILO Convention 182, Concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labor, or the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child.288 Additionally, commentators suggest that
corporations use outside monitors to help give the
implementation of their codes credibility and transparency.289
But even though they find it desirable to develop greater
uniformity among the corporate codes, Macklein and Trebilcock
also recognize that the variation of standards found in the codes
is a source of their strength as well as their weakness."' The
authors note, "[b]y locating the source of regulation in the
transnational corporation [or MNC] itself, a corporate code of
conduct also can identify with much more precision how general
standards are to govern specific workplaces."29 ' In contrast to
domestic or international standards, "codes can be tailored to
account for the complexity and fluidity of flexible forms of
transnational production . "..."292 Unlike domestic laws, codes
''can ... adapt relatively quickly to structural changes in a firm,
sector or economy ....293
Ultimately, the unpredictable danger of media investigation
and public scrutiny should motivate corporations to comply with
their self-imposed codes. While this self-imposed compliance
may not be the most efficient manner of eliminating exploitative
child labor, it provides an opportunity to foster global consensus
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=253833.
287. The Gap successfully negotiated an agreement with representatives of a
trade union, the Mandarin Workers Union, the Archdiocese of San Salvador, and the
Human Rights Institute of the University of San Salvador. REVISED RESOLUTION
DECLARATION, March 22, 1996, supra note 237; The End of Child Labour, supra note
40, at 77 (recommending the empowerment of children to organize in youth groups
and trade unions); see also Liubicic, supra note 188, at 153-54.
288. See Jill Murray, Corporate Social Responsibilities: An Overview of
Principles and Practices 19 (Int'l Labor Org., Working Paper No. 34, 2004)
(recommending incorporation of ILO standards into corporate codes), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/codes/5/.
289. Jaffe & Weiss, supra note 16, at 919-20; Liubicic, supra note 188, at 138.
290. MACKLEM & TREBILCOCK, supra note 137, at 44.





and cooperation among developed and developing countries
until an international labor regimen is forthcoming.
5. The Influence of Corporate Codes
The idea that corporate codes of conduct can significantly
reduce child labor has attracted the criticism that such codes
can only affect a fraction of the children who work.294 The
majority of children who work do so in agriculture, in family
settings at home, the domestic manufacturing sector, or service-
oriented positions in homes and restaurants, not in a factory.295
In fact, a manufacturing job in the export sector is likely to be a
better job than most of the other employment available to poor
children in developing countries.2 96 As a result, only local or
national governments can effectively regulate the majority of
exploitative child labor situations through enforcement of their
child labor laws. Corporate codes might even be
counterproductive by, in effect, distracting attention from the
duties that governments must perform.297
The recent ILO Report announcing reductions in the
number of children who labor around the world indicates that in
the teeth of increased global competition for cheap labor, the
child labor situation is improving. The ILO found:
[t]he number of child laborers in both age groups 5-14 and 5-17 fell by
11 per cent over the four years from 2000 to 2004. However, the
decline was much greater for those engaged in hazardous work: by 26
per cent for the 5-17 age group, and 33 per cent for 5 to 14 year-olds..
. Child work is declining, and the more harmful the work and the more
vulnerable the children involved, the faster the decline.298
The improvement is not attributable to corporate codes
alone, though the ILO Report makes it clear that corporate
codes have played a crucial role in this improvement. 99 But the
294. Liubicic, supra note 188, at 140 (noting that workplaces which are
unrelated to U.S. markets and MNCs whose products do not derive value from
corporate reputation are not protected by code and labeling efforts).
295. Id. at 140-41; see also White, supra note 135, at 832:
[iun recent years, powerful lobbying organizations have been promoting
various forms of trade sanctions. . . These efforts focus exclusively on
child labour in the export sector, which represents a very small percentage
of child employment in most countries, and . .. is not the sector in which
the worst working conditions and abuse of children ... [is] found.
296. Consider the results when children in Bangladesh lost their jobs and had to
turn to less desirable employment. See supra notes 139-140.
297. See Liubicic, supra note 188, at 149.
298. The End of Child Labour, supra note 40, at 7 (emphasis in original).
299. The ILO report describes the contributions of employers as critical in
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ILO report also speaks of a "growing global consensus" among
the governments of developing countries on the need to set
standards on child labor,3"' and illustrates this consensus with
examples of programs from various developing countries that
reduce child labor. °1
Developing countries are realizing that poverty cannot be
eliminated without the elimination of child labor, because
"[child labor] is both the result of poverty and a way of
perpetuating it. '302  The toleration of child labor makes no
economic sense. The ILO Report cites a study that found that
the elimination of child labor and its replacement by universal
education yields benefits that exceed costs at a ratio of 6.7 to
1.303 Children who spend their youth working grow up to become
adults whose health is poorer, 3' and whose labor, if they can
work at all, will be worth much less than it would had they gone
to school.3 5  The child labor standards of corporate codes,
therefore, provide an impetus that nudges developing
governments toward reforms, which, these governments are
beginning to realize, serves their own best interests as well.
Hence, although corporations rather than governments
developed corporate codes to improve business, governments can
and do take advantage of the existence of these codes by
extending the standards to other, non-corporate areas of
employment in order to achieve goals that have thus far defied
national and international authorities, such as the elimination
of exploitative child labor and the cycle of poverty it implies.
Also, because the codes and their implementation are ideally an
outcome of negotiations between local labor interests and
several places of the Report, Id. at 69 passim (noting that "[e]mployers'
organizations played a key role in the development of sectoral alliances in the last
four years .... ).
300. Id. at 23.
301. Id. at 10-15 passim. Reports independent of the ILO suggest that in recent
years corporations are taking their social responsibilities more seriously:
after a decade of denying any wrongdoing, companies such as Nike and
Gap are now admitting that their workers have been exploited and abused,
and have pledged to improve the conditions of the millions of people who
are paid a few pence a day to make their top-selling goods.
Maxine Frith, The Ethical Revolution Sweeping Through the World's Sweatshops,
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), April 16, 2005 (News Section).
302. Geof Wood, Staying Secure, Staying Poor: The "Faustian Bargain" 31
WORLD DEV. 455, 468 (2003).
303. The End of Child Labour, supra note 40, at 33.
304. Id. at 32; see also F.C. Rosati & R. Straub, Does Work During Childhood
Affect the Health of Guatemalan Adults?, 5 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 83 (2007)
(reporting results of study on adverse long-term health effects of child labor).
305. The End of Child Labour, supra note 40, at 33.
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corporations, they reflect greater flexibility toward local
economic circumstances and therefore are more acceptable to a
developing country than uniform and coercive standards of a
national or international agreement would be.
Because corporate codes are neither generated by
government action nor motivated by government interests, their
implementation sidesteps the political confrontation between
developed and developing countries over core labor standards.
For one thing, these codes often require that the child labor laws
of the host country be respected.3 °6 The host country cannot very
well complain that the corporation is imposing some foreign
regime, or ignoring the law of the host country, when the
corporation is in fact insisting that the host country's domestic
law be respected.
Corporate codes of conduct mute the objections of
developing countries in another respect. The extent to which
corporations seek to impose and enforce codes of conduct
undercuts the argument that the global adoption of core labor
standards is merely a ploy to rob developing countries of their
cheap labor advantage. Unlike the governments of developed
countries, the corporations that are implementing codes of
conduct cannot be accused of having protectionist motivations.
The main reason these corporations are in developing countries
at all is to take advantage of the cheap labor markets there.
Corporations have invested a great deal in cultivating these
markets and cannot want to destroy them in order to return to
the more expensive labor of developed countries.
In implementing corporate codes, MNCs are pursuing
interests that are congruent, not adverse, to the interests of the
host developing country. Developing countries must eventually
face the fact that corporate implementation of codes of conduct
protects their economic interests as well as those of the
corporations. If a country develops a reputation for exploiting
the labor of its impoverished children, that country, like any
corporation, may itself become the target of consumer boycotts,
which may lead not only to a loss of business, but also to a
corporate exodus as well. "A potential loss of revenue from the
lucrative U.S. market arguably far outweighs any potential gain
to be made by hiring lower-cost child labor."3 °7
306. See MACKLEM & TREBILCOCK, supra note 137, at 30-31 (noting codes
referencing national laws).
307. APPAREL INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 118.
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CONCLUSION
It is uncertain whether corporate codes of conduct will
continue to have an impact on problems such as child labor.
Some may point to the failure of such codes in the past, such as
the Sullivan Principles, which, despite some improvements in
the labor situation of black South Africans, were nevertheless so
ineffective in undermining the system of apartheid in South
Africa that the creator of these Principles, the Reverend Leon
Sullivan, abandoned them.3"' The lesson to be learned here,
however, might not be that such codes can never have an effect,
but rather that they are of limited value against a government
that is ideologically intransigent on the issue of human rights.
The experience of Levi-Strauss, with its two-part code discussed
above, has pertinence here. According to its Guidelines, Levi-
Strauss will contract in states where there is a chance for
improvement in the rights of workers. But when the conditions
tolerated or fostered by a state make it impossible for a
corporation to monitor even those rights that should be under
its control, then that corporation will have no choice but to
leave. In the absence of any respect for human rights,
disinvestment may be the answer.3"9
The codes of conduct under discussion are not the result of
international organizations or the product of treaties. These
corporate codes result from the far-flung sourcing contracts of
multinational corporations, in countries where these
corporations cannot rely on government enforcement of child
labor laws. The situation that creates these codes is the
manufacture and export of items such as footwear or soccer balls
that go from the hands of impoverished children working in
developing countries to the hands of wealthy children playing in
developed countries half the world away.
Though the result is humanitarian, the driving force behind
these codes is the avoidance of corporate embarrassment, which
can mean the loss of sales. Corporations are now under the
constant threat of embarrassment because investigative
reporters can readily travel anywhere in the world with their
308. Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 60, at 666-67; Cassel, supra
note 182, at 1970-71; Sullivan, supra note 182, at 1496 (explaining new and "more
stringent" principles introduced in 1985).
309. Consider comments regarding the Clinton labor accord in Greenhouse,
supra note 271, at 20 ("Labor union officials say they expect a struggle with
companies over the steps their Chinese factories should take to allow freedom of
association. 'China represents a special kind of problem,' Mr. Mazur said. 'China
has to be dealt with once this thing gets off the ground.").
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video cameras collecting footage of laboring children that may
be shown on CNN, the major networks, or the internet, or be
splashed across the front pages of the major tabloids. The
embarrassment is particularly intense when a figure of popular
culture who endorses the products at issue, such as Kathie Lee
Gifford, is dragged into the moral drama, for the exploitation of
children provides what is perhaps the most provocative example
of abusive labor practices. If humanitarian instinct should fail,
concern for the possible loss of popular good will and consequent
financial losses will motivate these figures and their corporate
sponsors to sever their ties with exploitative child labor. But
the embarrassment also reaches each individual whose
purchase of a recognizable brand of clothing may elicit from
friends and acquaintances the comment, "Did you know that
children made that?" Influential journalists expose exploitation
and tar corporations, celebrities, and even individuals who have
any association with the products of child labor."'
The process by which corporations produce these codes
largely bypasses the traditional players in international
relations and human rights-that is, the states. This process
begins with reporters and journalists reaching across the globe
to expose violations of human rights. Responding to these
revelations, consumers enforce their understanding of human
rights standards by refusing to purchase from known violators.
To remedy and prevent the appearance of facilitating human
rights violations, corporations benefiting from labor in
developing countries respond by promulgating codes of conduct
that define their workers' rights. Traditionally, codes
containing rights were the product of nations and took the form
of a treaty, a convention, or a Bill of Rights. But while the
traditional instruments of international and national law have
largely failed to regulate this contested area, corporate codes of
conduct have introduced some progress. Hence, corporate codes
have helped where governments and international law have
thus far failed: the enforcement of workers' rights, especially
those of the child.
Whatever their eventual impact may be on child labor,
corporate codes of conduct are the product of globalization. In
distinguishing globalization from internationalization, Professor
Jost Delbrfick wrote, "globalization . . .may be defined as a
means to enable nation-states to satisfy the national interest in
310. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 105 (1992) (noting that developments in communications technology are
harbingers of globalization).
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areas where they are incapable of doing so on their own."311
Confronted with the failure of nations and international bodies
to resolve the dilemma of exploitative child labor, actors who are
not themselves nations or representatives of nations have
developed a possible solution.3"2
There is a term for the business practices or customs that
are used to adjudicate contractual differences among
international business parties without recourse to domestic or
international courts of law. This term, "lex mercatoria," or law
merchant, consists of "contract practices, understandings,
regulations, and decisions [that] constitute a body of customary
law which is the foundation on which national and international
commercial legislation has been and continues to be built."33
The development of corporate codes of conduct may signal a
similar development among corporations in the area of labor,
child labor in particular. Perhaps this is a lex humanitariana?
311. Jost DelbrUck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets - Implications
for Domestic Law - A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 11
(1993) (emphasis in original omitted).
312. Some commentators refer to corporate codes as a species of soft law because
they do not have the enforcement capacity usually associated with law. Kuruvilla &
Verma, supra note 56, at 4. However, another term that may more accurately
describe such codes in view of the role globalization has played in generating them is
one that was first coined by Gunther Teubner. Teubner's term "global law"
designates "a new body of law from various globalization processes in multiple
sectors of civil society." Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina. Legal Pluralism in the
World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 4 (G. Teubner, ed. 1997).
313. Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 235, 237 (1988).
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